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In this dissertation, I combine theoretical and empirical approaches, as well as concepts from the 
human and non-human animal literature, to investigate the effect of different types of 
competition on cooperation among members of a social group. These lines of research are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing: drawing on approaches developed to analyze the 
behavior of one taxon to investigate another can help us elucidate universal principles governing 
the evolution of cooperation and conflict over resource division.  
 
In chapters 1 and 2, I apply game theoretic “tug-of-war” models of reproductive skew to conflict 
over resource contribution and division within human groups. In chapter 1, I consider 
competition over individuals’ personal resources. The results of a laboratory economic game 
support the theoretical prediction that the potential for such competition favors cooperative 
contribution to an equally shared group resource from which everyone benefits. In chapter 2, I 
relax the assumption of equal sharing, and demonstrate theoretically and empirically that 
competition over resource division leads to lower contributions and payoffs.  
 
In chapters 3 and 4, I extend a tug-of-war model of intergroup competition to investigate conflict 
over resources shared among social insect colonies. I focus on the primitively eusocial wasp 
Polistes dominulus, as individuals display behavioral flexibility and benefit from investing in 
  
both cooperation and conflict. In chapter 3, I use field and lab experiments test theoretical 
predictions that P. dominulus may not face a simple tradeoff between within-group cooperation 
and competition. In chapter 4, I demonstrate mathematically that asymmetries among group 
members in relatedness and dominance affect cooperation and conflict within insect societies 
engaged in intergroup competition. 
 
In chapter 5, I consider competition over foraging contributions in P. dominulus, and show in a 
field manipulation that aggression towards experimentally removed workers is higher when these 
wasps received food while they were in the lab. This leads to questions about the possible 
function of aggression in within-group competition and cooperation in this species. 
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CHAPTER 1 
COMPETITION OVER PERSONAL RESOURCES FAVORS CONTRIBUTION 
TO SHARED RESOURCES IN HUMAN GROUPS 
 
Jessica L. Barker, Pat Barclay and H. Kern Reeve 
 
Members of social groups face a trade-off between keeping personal resources for themselves 
and cooperatively contributing them to produce a shared group resource. Many group resources 
are shared equitably: they may be intrinsically non-excludable public goods, such as vigilance 
against predators; or so large that there is little cost to sharing, such as cooperatively hunted big 
game. However, group members’ personal resources, such as food hunted individually, may be 
monopolizable. In such cases, an individual may benefit by investing in taking others’ personal 
resources, and in defending one’s own resources against others. We use a game theoretic “tug-of-
war” model to predict that when such competition over personal resources is possible, players 
will contribute more towards a group resource, and also obtain higher payoffs from doing so. We 
test and support these predictions in two laboratory economic games in humans, comparing 
people’s investment decisions in games with and without the options to compete over personal 
resources or invest in a group resource. Our results help explain why people cooperatively 
contribute to group resources, suggest how a tragedy of the commons may be avoided, and 
highlight unifying features in the evolution of cooperation and competition in human and non-
human societies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Conflict over the division of resources arises across the animal kingdom, from intraorganismal 
conflict (Michod and Roze 2001) to competition among social group members  (Keller and 
Reeve 1994; Sherman et al. 1995; Dugatkin 1997), including humans (Mace and Alvergne 
2012). For individuals in social groups, two types of resources can potentially be divided: 
personal resources that each individual has kept for itself, such as food from a solitary hunt, and 
group resources consisting of individuals’ pooled contributions, such as large prey caught in a 
cooperative hunt, and which are shared, often equally, among all group members (Stanford and 
Bunn 2001; Gurven 2004). In this study, we investigate how the potential to take other people’s 
personal resources may increase the benefit of contributing to group resources that are equitably 
divided, a topic of considerable social and political importance in human groups (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2007). 
 
Some resources to which group members contribute (hereafter, group resources) are non-
excludable and non-rivalrous (public goods, sensu strictu): that is, they are intrinsically 
accessible to all group members, are non-depletable, and thus there is no competition over their 
division. For example, in an insect society, workers’ investments in raising the queen’s offspring 
benefits all group members according to their relatedness to the queen (Hamilton 1964); 
likewise, the benefits of predator inspection or vigilance (e.g. in guppies: Dugatkin 1991) are 
automatically shared. Similarly, many group resources shared by humans are intrinsically non-
contestable public goods, such as clean air, public radio, and defense against other groups 
(Boone 1992).  
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Other group resources are depletable or potentially monopolizable, for example food shared 
among chimpanzees Pan troglodytes (Melis et al. 2006) and humans (Bliege Bird and Bird 
1997). However, in practice many of these resources are shared, such that they are functionally 
non-contestable. Sharing may occur because the group resource is so large, e.g. big game from a 
cooperative hunt or plentiful fish stocks, that it is too costly monopolize (i.e. not economically 
defendable: Boone 1992; Cashdan 1992), or that sharing is low-cost if an individual becomes 
satiated (i.e. tolerated theft: Blurton Jones 1984; Blurton Jones 1987; Winterhalder 1996b). 
Alternatively, group members may benefit by investing in mechanisms to prevent competition 
over shared resources, such as policing (Ratnieks and Reeve 1992; Frank 1995; Flack et al. 2006; 
Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2007; El Mouden et al. 2010) and, in human groups, social institutions 
(Bowles et al. 2003; West et al. 2011). Indeed, human groups are noteworthy for the degree to 
which potentially monopolizable group resources are shared equally (Kaplan and Hill 1985; 
Hawkes et al. 2001). 
 
In contrast, individuals may keep personal resources for themselves, which are often excludable, 
depletable “private goods”, such as wealth or food (Boone 1992), for example the !Kung own 
small prey from individual hunts (Hawkes 2001). In some societies, there is less emphasis on 
sharing goods and more on keeping personal resources for oneself, e.g. among the Machiguenga 
(Henrich et al. 2005), and in these cases, an individual may be able to increase the size of her 
own personal resources by selfishly taking personal resources from others. For example, in non-
human primates, harassment over food is common, e.g. in macaques Macaca fascicularis 
(Kummer and Cords 1991), squirrel monkeys Saimiri boliviensis (Stevens 2004) and 
chimpanzees Pan troglodytes (Goodall 1986); and members of some human societies similarly 
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attempt to steal others’ personal resources, e.g. among the Dobu (Benedict 1934) and the Mikea 
(Tucker 2004). In response, individuals benefit by investing in resource defense (Chapman and 
Kramer 1996) in order to reduce their group-mates’ selfish efforts. For example, hymenopteran 
workers eat eggs selfishly laid by other workers in order to lay their own (Bonckaert et al. 2010); 
humans also invest in policing to protect their resources. 
 
Investing in taking others’ and defending one’s own resources (hereafter, “competition”) is 
costly to all group members, constituting an “arms race” of investment in manipulation and 
counter-manipulation that reduces the amount that individuals invest in their personal or group 
resources (Ratnieks and Reeve 1992). There is thus a trade-off between investing in group 
resources, personal resources, and competition, and so the division of contestable personal 
resources may affect individuals’ investments in group resources. We hypothesize that 
competition over individuals’ personal resources increases the benefit of contributing to a non-
contested group resource of which all group members obtain an equitable share: this is because 
an individual will reliably gain a benefit from greater investment in the group resource, but any 
benefit from greater investment in personal resources may be reduced by others’ investments in 
competition. Under this hypothesis, we predict that: (1) given that individuals have the 
opportunity to contribute to a group resource, contributions will be higher when competition over 
personal resources is possible versus when it is prevented; and (2) given that there is competition 
over personal resources, individuals’ payoffs will be higher when they have the opportunity to 
contribute to a group resource. 
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We investigated this hypothesis both mathematically and empirically. Firstly, we used a game 
theoretic “tug-of-war” model (Reeve et al. 1998) to predict individuals’ optimal investments in 
cooperation and competition. In a basic tug-of-war, an individual obtains a fraction of resource 
proportional to its investment in competition relative to other group members. Individuals’ 
investments in competition diminish the absolute amount of the contested resource, i.e. there is a 
tradeoff between increasing one’s own fraction and reducing the total amount of resource. Tugs-
of-war have been used to analyze the division of group resources in both invertebrates, 
particularly social insects (Reeve and Keller 2001), and vertebrates, e.g. mountain gorillas 
Gorilla beringei beringei (Bradley et al. 2005), cooperatively breeding cichlids Neolamprologus 
pulcher (Heg and Hamilton 2008) and humans (Barclay 2011; Barker et al. 2012). Here, we 
apply the tug-of-war framework to the division of personal resources. Secondly, we tested the 
verbal and mathematical predictions in human groups. We used laboratory economic games 
based on a “public goods” game (Dawes and Thaler 1988; Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995): 
economic experiments do reflect people’s behavior outside the laboratory (Henrich et al. 2005) 
and provide a rigorous way to investigate the collective action problem of resource sharing faced 
by pre-industrial human groups. 
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MODEL 
 
No competition over personal resources 
 
We start by considering a classic public goods game (Dawes and Thaler 1988; Davis and Holt 
1993; Ledyard 1995) where each individual has a personal resource of value v, of which she 
contributes an amount y to a shared group resource, and keeps v-y for herself. All contributions 
to the group resource are summed and multiplied by k, and then split equally among the n 
members of the group. 
 
We seek the optimal contribution y* that maximizes the amount of resources an individual 
obtains, i.e. maximizes its fitness. To do this, we consider the amount of resources wy obtained 
by a focal individual contributing y in a population of n-1 other individuals contributing y*: 
 
Equation 1.1 
   (   )   
 
 
 (  (   )  )  
 
At the Nash equilibrium, the focal individual’s contribution y is equal to all others’ contributions 
y*, and dwy/dy = 0, which allows us to solve for y*. We find that y* is an endpoint maximum: 
that is, individuals should contribute either all (v) or none (0) of their personal resources, but not 
an intermediate amount. (For details on finding the endpoint maxima, see appendix.) We 
determine that when k>n, y* = v (individuals maximize their fitness by contributing all of their 
personal resources, and obtain a payoff wy=kv), but when k<n, y* = 0 (individuals maximize their 
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fitness by keeping all of their own resources, and obtain a payoff wy=v).  This basic finding 
replicates previous theoretical work on public goods contributions (e.g. Davis and Holt 1993; 
Ledyard 1995), and we build on it in subsequent sections. 
 
“Tug-of-war” over personal resources 
 
We now consider the case where any personal resource that an individual does not contribute to 
the shared group resource may be taken by other group members. An individual invests x in 
attempting to defend her personal resources from others, and z in trying to take others’ personal 
resources; i.e., a “tug-of-war” competition (Reeve et al. 1998) over resources not contributed to 
the group. Each investment z is spread evenly among the other group members; that is, an 
investment z is corresponds to an investment  
(   )
 in taking from any given player. The 
effectiveness of a given investment in resource defense relative to an investment in taking from 
others is given by the factor b. 
 
We seek the optimal values x*, y* and z*, and again do so by considering a mutant individual 
adopting the strategies x, y and z, in a population of n-1 others adopting the optimal strategies x*, 
y* and z*. The fraction of resources that the focal individual defends, d, is determined by her 
investment in resource defense relative to the other players’ investments in taking from her: 
 
Equation 1.2 
  
  
   (   )  
 
(   )
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The fraction of resources that the focal individual takes from another player, t, corresponds to her 
investment in taking from that player relative to that player’s resource defense and n-2 other 
players’ efforts in taking from him: 
 
Equation 1.3 
  
 
(   )
 
(   )
     (   )  
 
(   )
 
 
After her investments above, the focal player has an amount v-x-y-z of resources to keep for 
herself. The total amount of resources that this focal individual obtains, wxyz, is therefore a 
fraction d of what she kept for herself plus a fraction t of what each other player kept for himself, 
plus an equal share of the contributions to the group resource: 
 
Equation 1.4 
      (       )  (   ) (   
       )  
 
 
 (  (   )  ) 
 
We then find the partial derivatives δwxyz/δx, δwxyz/δy and δwxyz/δz; we evaluate these derivatives 
at x=x*, y=y* and z=z*, when all individuals are adopting the optimal strategies, and set them 
equal to zero. As above, we find an endpoint maximum for y*: when k>1, y*=v (individuals 
should contribute everything, and obtain a payoff wxyz=kv), and when k<1, y*=0 (individuals 
should contribute nothing). Thus, the condition favoring contributions to the group resource in 
this game with a tug-of-war over personal resources (k>1) is more permissive than that in the 
standard public goods game with no tug-of-war (k>n).  
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For cases where y*=0 (including when there is simply no group resource to which players can 
contribute), we simultaneously solve δwxyz/δx=0 and δwxyz/δz=0 for the values x* and z*. We 
verify that these correspond to fitness maxima by checking that the second derivatives are 
negative. When resistance and stealing are equally effective (b=1, as in our experiment; see 
appendix for solutions when b≠1), we find that the optimal strategies are: 
 
Equation 1.5 
   
(   ) 
  
    
(   )  
  
 
 
Thus, a player should invest n-1 times as much in taking (z*) than in defense (x*), since each 
investment in taking is spread among the n-1 other players. 
 
Substituting these values for x* and z* into wxyz, we find that at equilibrium an individual obtains 
a payoff wxyz=
 
 
. Because this payoff is smaller than kv, players do better by investing in the 
group resource whenever one is available and there are collective gains from doing so (k>1). 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Overview of economic game 
 
We recruited participants from the Cornell University community using posters and mailing lists. 
Participants played an economic game in groups of four people (118 females and 66 males of 
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various ethnicities, mean age: 20.85 years ±s.e 0.30 years). Each group (n=46) of participants 
played two experimental conditions (see below), programmed using z-Tree software 
(Fischbacher 2007). Each participant played the game at a computer terminal visually isolated 
from the other players; all decisions were confidential, and methods were approved by the 
Institutional Review Board for Human Participants.  
 
Players completed instructions and a test of understanding before starting each experimental 
condition in the game. Each condition contained 10 rounds; players received 100 “lab dollars” 
(L$) each round, which they could invest in different ways depending on the condition. 
Participants did not know how many rounds of the game they would play. At the end of the 
game, lab dollars were exchanged for cash payoffs in US dollars (L$300:US$1, plus a baseline 
payment of US$2), with a mean payoff of US$9.10 ± s.e. US$0.18, with exact earnings 
depending on participants’ decisions during the game. 
 
Public goods game condition: Contribute & Keep (CK) 
 
Each participant could divide her money among two options: contribution to the group (C) and 
setting aside personal money to keep for herself (K). (In the experiment, these were called the 
“group fund” and “production fund” respectively, to avoid framing problems). As in a standard 
public goods game, contributions to the group fund were doubled and redistributed equally 
among all players (Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995; Barclay 2004). Each player’s payoff at 
the end of each round was therefore equal to the money she kept plus her quarter share of the 
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doubled group fund (Equation 1.1). Information about all players’ contributions and payoffs was 
displayed on each participant’s computer screen before she moved onto the next round. 
 
Tug-of-war condition: Keep, Take, & Defend (KTD) 
 
In this condition, a group fund was not available for players to contribute to. Each participant 
could keep money for herself (K), but could also invest in attempting to take the personal money 
that others kept (T) and defending her own personal money from others’ attempts to take it (D). 
These investments constitute a “tug-of-war” over players’ personal resources, corresponding to 
strategies z and x respectively in the model (see above); in the experiment they were called 
“extraction” and “retention”. Each player’s payoff at the end of each round was equal to the 
personal money she defended plus the money she took from others (i.e. Equation 1.4 with 
y=y*=0). As in the Contribute & Keep condition (CK), participants saw a computer screen with 
all players’ investments in each fund and their payoffs before they started a new round of the 
game. 
 
Of the money kept for herself, the amount that a participant retained at the end of the round 
depended on her investment in defense relative to other players’ investments in taking from her 
(Equation 1.2). For example, if player A invested L$30 in defense and the other three players 
invested a total of L$50 in taking from her, then A would end up with a 3/8 share [30/(30+50)] of 
her own personal money. 
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As in the model above, a player’s investment in taking from others was divided among the three 
other group members: for example, a L$30 investment meant a player invested L$10 in taking 
from each other player’s personal money. The amount of money that a participant received from 
another player’s personal keepings depended on her own investment in taking from him relative 
to his investment in defense, and the other players’ investments in taking (Equation 1.3). For 
example, if player B invested L$30 in defense, player A invested L$10 in taking from him, and 
the other two players invested L$20 each in taking from him, player A would get a 1/8 share 
(10/[10+30+20+20]) of B’s personal money. If no-one invested in taking from anyone else, each 
person would keep all of her personal money. 
 
Public goods game plus tug-of-war condition: Contribute, Keep, Take, & Defend (CKTD) 
 
Participants playing this condition had four options. Each player could invest in keeping money 
(K) for herself; taking (T) from others’ kept amounts; and defending (D) her own kept amount 
from others’ taking, as in the tug-of-war game. Additionally, each player could invest in 
contributing (C) to a group fund that was doubled and divided equally, as in the public goods 
game. That is, investments in taking and defending apply only to the money players kept for 
themselves, and not to the money contributed to the group fund. Each participant’s payoff at the 
end of each round was thus equal to one quarter of the doubled group fund, plus personal money 
she defended, plus others’ personal money that she took (Equation 1.4). 
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Comparisons of experimental conditions and statistical analyses 
 
Each group played two experimental conditions, with the order of conditions counterbalanced 
between groups. This allowed us to make the following comparisons: 
 
Comparison 1: CKTD versus CK (i.e. public goods game with/without tug-of-war). 26 
groups played experimental conditions CK and CKTD; that is, the possibility to invest in the tug-
of-war differed between conditions. 
 
Comparison 2: CKTD versus KTD (i.e. tug-of-war with/without group resource). 20 groups 
played experimental conditions KTD and CKTD; that is, the possibility to contribute to the 
shared group fund differed between conditions. 
 
The within-subject design is an important feature of this empirical test. The model predicts that 
since n=4 and k=2 in our game: a) in the CKTD condition, participants should contribute 
everything (y*=v); b) in the CK condition, participants should keep all of their personal resources 
(y*=0); and c) in the KTD condition, participants should adopt the stable intermediate values of 
x* and z* (Equation 1.5). However, people typically avoid extreme decisions in laboratory 
economic games (Kümmerli et al. 2010), even when doing so is not optimal, and thus are 
unlikely to invest the absolute values predicted by any model (Ledyard 1995; Yamagishi et al. 
2009). The relevant predictions here are therefore the relative differences in people’s decisions 
between experimental conditions (Kümmerli et al. 2010; Barker et al. 2012). 
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We treated each group of 4 participants as an n of 1, to control for interdependence within 
groups. We analyzed the data using a general linear model (SPSS 17.0) with experimental 
condition and round as within-groups variables, and with the order of conditions as a between-
groups variable. For two groups in the CKTD versus CK experiment, minor problems arose with 
the instructions program during the game (quiz questions appearing at the wrong time or not at 
all), but excluding these groups from the analysis did not affect the results. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Comparison 1:  CKTD versus CK (with/without tug-of-war). 
 
Contributions to the group fund were significantly higher when people could invest in the tug-of-
war (CKTD condition: L$53.4 ± s.e. L$4.3) than in the condition without a tug-of-war (CK 
condition: L$39.0 ± s.e. L$4.6; F(1,24)=10.86, p=0.003). This is all the more striking given that 
participants had the opportunity to spread their money among four options in the CKTD 
condition, compared with two in the CK condition: having more options would normally dilute 
participants’ investments among those options, and yet participants still invested more in the 
group fund, and kept less money for themselves, when the tug-of-war was present (see appendix 
for further evidence of this).  
 
There was a significant interaction between experimental condition and round number 
(F(9,216)=10.20, p<0.001): in the CK condition, contributions fell over time (F(9,216)=10.12, 
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p<0.001), whereas contributions increased in the CKTD condition (F(9,216)=3.04, p=0.002). 
The possibility of investing in a tug-of-war thus means that contributions do not fall (Figure 1.1). 
Order was counterbalanced across sections; see appendix for an analysis of order effects on 
contributions over time. 
 
Despite the higher contributions in the CKTD condition, participants earned significantly higher 
payoffs in the CK condition (L$139.0 ±L$4.6) compared to the CKTD condition (L$121.1 
±L$7.0; F(1,24)=8.85, p=0.007, no effect of order; Figure 1.2a); that is, people were worse off 
when they had the option to invest in a tug-of-war, because the tug-of-war used up resources. 
 
Comparison 2: CKTD versus KTD (with/without group resource) 
 
Participants’ payoffs were significantly higher when they could contribute to a shared group 
resource (CKTD condition: L$123.6 ± s.e. L$9.6) than in the experimental condition without the 
option for contribution (KTD condition: L$28.6 ± s.e. L$1.4; F(1,18)=90.77, p<0.001; Figure 
1.2b). There was no effect of order or interaction with order on any of the results regarding 
participants’ payoffs (all Fs <1). 
 
People’s higher payoffs in the CKTD condition may simply be because money contributed to the 
group fund, unlike that kept in a personal fund, was not subject to the tug-of-war, or because it 
was doubled before being equally divided among participants (k=2). In order to distinguish 
between these alternatives, we can hypothetically adjust people’s payoffs to determine what they 
would have obtained if the group resource had not been doubled (k=1). Participants’ adjusted
16 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Mean (± s.e.) contributions in lab dollars to the group fund in each round when there 
is a public goods game plus tug-of-war (CKTD condition, dashed line) versus a public goods 
game only (CK condition, dotted line).
17 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Mean (± s.e.) payoffs in lab dollars (L$) per round (means are calculated over 10 
rounds of each condition). If all players had contributed all of their money to the group fund each 
round, the each player’s payoff would be L$200; if all players had kept all of their money for 
themselves each round, each player’s payoff would be L$100. (a) Comparison of games with and 
without the tug-of-war options. (b) Comparison of games with and without the option to 
contribute to a group fund. Black bar shows players’ adjusted payoffs if money contributed to the 
group fund had not been doubled (i.e. if k=1).
18 
 
payoffs in the CKTD condition (L$68.5 ± s.e. L$4.2) are still significantly higher than in the 
KTD condition (F(1,18)=79.23, p<0.001; Figure 1.2b), suggesting that the difference in payoffs 
is not simply due to the group resource being doubled. Please note, however, that participants 
made their decisions in light of the fact that the group resource was doubled, and thus this latter 
analysis does not explain participants’ behavior during the game, but rather provides a reason 
why their payoffs were higher in the CKTD condition. 
 
In the KTD condition, people kept significantly more money, and invested significantly more in 
the tug-of-war, than in the CKTD condition (all Fs >24, all ps <0.001, Table 1.1;  no effect of 
order or interaction with order: all Fs <1). This is not surprising, as people had only three 
investment options in the KTD condition, compared with four in the CKTD condition. Instead, 
the relevant values are the relative investments: how much people kept for themselves and 
invested in the tug-of-war, out of the total not contributed to the group fund (i.e. the amount 
invested in each of keeping, taking and defense, divided by the sum of these three investments). 
There was no significant difference in people’s relative investments between the two conditions 
(all Fs <2; all ps >0.2). In the KTD condition, people invested more in taking than in defense or 
amounts kept (F(1,17)=5.21, p=0.017; Table 1.1), as predicted by the model. Taking money is 
not a prosocial act: people who take more from their group-mates tend to contribute a lower 
proportion of their remaining money to the group fund (see appendix). 
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Table 1.1. Mean (± s.e.) investments in the experimental conditions with and without the option 
to contribute to a shared group resource (CKTD and KTD respectively). Participants could 
spread their money among four options in the CKTD condition, compared to three in the KTD 
condition; in order to control for this, the “relative amount” column shows the amounts 
participants kept and invested in taking and defense relative to the sum of investments in these 
three options. 
 
 CKTD condition KTD condition 
c 
Absolute amount 
a 
Relative amount 
b 
Kept for self 13.4 ±2.2 31.3 ±2.1 28.6 ±1.4 
Investment in taking
 
16.9 ±2.0
 
38.9 ±2.1
 
41.3 ±2.5
 
Investment in defense 14.7 ±2.5 29.8 ±2.4 30.1 ±1.6 
Contribution 55.1 ±5.5 n/a n/a 
Total 
d 
100 100 100 
a
 Participants invested significantly lower absolute amounts in taking, defense and keeping in 
CKTD than in KTD (all Fs >24; all ps <0.001). 
b 
There was no significant difference in the relative amounts invested in each of the three options 
in CKTD versus KTD (all Fs <2; all ps >0.2). 
c 
Participants invested significantly more in taking money than in either defense or keeping 
money (F(1,17)=5.21, p=0.017) in the KTD condition. In the CKTD condition, the results were 
in the same direction but were not quite significant (relative amounts: F(1,17)=3.15, p=0.069; 
absolute amounts: F(1,17)=2.60, p=0.103).  
d
 Totals may not sum exactly to 100 due to rounding. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Contributions to the group resource 
 
People’s contributions to a public good were higher when they could also invest in tug-of-war 
competition (CKTD condition) than when there was no tug-of-war (CK condition); this was true 
despite having more investment options in the former experimental condition. In addition, the 
presence of a tug-of-war prevented the decline in contributions over time; such a decline is 
otherwise typical in public goods games when such competition is absent (CK condition; Dawes 
and Thaler 1988; Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995) unless reputations or punishment are 
present (Wedekind and Milinski 2000; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Barclay 2004). This finding can 
plausibly be explained by people choosing to contribute more when their own resources were at 
risk of being taken, since competition over the group resource was not permitted. 
 
Thus, this empirical result supports the game theoretic prediction that in a game with a tug-of-
war (CKTD condition), players should contribute to the group resource above a lower threshold 
return on their investment than in a game without a tug-of-war (CK condition). Two potential 
criticisms of this result are unlikely to be problematic. Firstly, people may have contributed more 
in response to being confused by having more options; however, they were tested on their 
understanding of the game before they were allowed to begin the experiment. Secondly, people 
contributed in all experimental conditions in the laboratory game even when this was not the 
optimal strategy predicted by the model for the parameters of our experiment. This is very 
common in experimental games (Dawes and Thaler 1988; Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995) 
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and may occur because people avoid extreme strategies in laboratory games, regardless of 
whether they are optimal (Kümmerli et al. 2010). Our within-subjects empirical design controls 
for this by allowing us to analyze the relative differences between experimental conditions. 
 
Tugs-of-war and the tragedy of the commons 
 
Unlike in games with punishment, in this experiment a participant could not target her 
investments in resource defense and taking towards a specific other player. In addition, people 
who took more money from others tended to contribute a smaller proportion of their remaining 
endowment (see analysis in appendix). This suggests that, in contrast to other cases where people 
spent money in order to reduce the payoffs of the highest earners (Zizzo and Oswald 2001; Zizzo 
2004) or lowest contributors (Yamagishi 1986; Fehr and Gächter 2002), investments in taking 
and defense here were not altruistic sanctions but were simply made in order to maximize one’s 
own personal resources relative to others. This leads to a costly arms race, where people benefit 
by escalating their competitive investments. Investing in competition reduces the amount of 
money one can keep or contribute, thus resulting in a tragedy of the commons where everyone is 
worse off than if no-one had invested in competition (Hardin 1968; Frank 2007; Rankin et al. 
2007). The results of the laboratory game reflect this, with people receiving lower payoffs in the 
CKTD condition than the CK condition. 
The lowest payoffs overall were in the KTD condition, where people did not have the option to 
contribute to a group resource; that is, payoffs in KTD < CKTD < CK. A potential explanation 
for the higher payoffs in CKTD versus KTD is that all contributions to the group resource were 
doubled, whereas money in players’ personal resources was not. However, had contributions not 
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been doubled (k=1; “adjusted earnings”), people would still have earned more in the CKTD 
condition. Players’ higher payoffs are thus better explained by the non-contestability of the group 
resource: equal division precluded people spending money in a competitive arms race. This 
suggests that the opportunity to contribute to a group resource over which there is no competition 
may provide a solution to the tragedy of the commons caused by a tug-of-war over personal 
resources. 
 
Competition and the evolution of shared group resources 
 
In many scenarios outside the laboratory, humans possess resources that can potentially be taken 
by others, as when the Hadza (Marlowe 2004) and Mikea (Tucker 2004) attempt to hide private 
shares of food. People also frequently contribute to common resources that are shared among all 
group members; if these resources are not intrinsically non-excludable, competition over them is 
nonetheless frequently precluded. For example, there may be no net cost to sharing if the 
resource is large enough, as in a Lamalera whale hunt (Henrich et al. 2005) or Meriam turtle hunt 
(Bliege Bird and Bird 1997); alternatively, the cost of not sharing may be high if the resource is 
divided in public, as among the Nayaka (Bird-David 1990). Such group resources act as “banks” 
where individuals’ investments are protected from scramble competition (i.e. converted into 
public goods) and possibly even gain value (k>1); indeed, this is likely why monetary banks 
were initially established (Hildreth 1837; Bolles 1903). 
 
The “tug-of-war arms race over personal resources” hypothesis described here provides one 
explanation for contribution to non-contestable group resources: that is, the net cost of defending 
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one’s own personal resources and attempting to take others’ outweighs the cost of contributing to 
resources that are shared by all, analogous to models of food-sharing by harassment in non-
human primates (Stevens and Stephens 2002; Stevens 2004; Gilby 2006). This hypothesis is not 
mutually exclusive with other explanations such as reciprocity and risk reduction in uncertain 
environments (Cashdan 1990). In the present experiment, we isolated the effects of competition 
by having participants: a) make anonymous decisions, thus reducing reciprocity and reputation; 
b) receive a fixed amount of money each round, thus not have to buffer uncertainty; and c) never 
get satiated, and thus not benefit by contributing to others. Please note that this hypothesis 
provides an ultimate explanation (Tinbergen 1963) for contribution to shared group resources, 
and does not attempt to elucidate individuals’ proximate motivations. 
 
In sum, the implications of this study are threefold. Firstly, the theoretical and empirical results 
suggest that the opportunity to contribute to an equally shared group resource (especially one that 
has the potential to earn interest) helps to limit mutually destructive competition over personal 
resources. Secondly, this finding is not specific to humans, but applies to any social groups in 
which individuals can compete over personal resources (Reeve et al. 1998) and contribute to 
shared group resources. For example, costly competition among hymenopteran workers over 
male production (Hammond and Keller 2004; Wenseleers et al. 2004) may select for contribution 
to the queen’s reproductive success as a non-excludable shared resource. By drawing on 
approaches developed in different disciplines, such as tug-of-war theory and economic games, 
we can uncover universal evolutionary principles governing the balance between cooperation 
and conflict across the animal kingdom. Finally, much environmental and social conflict in 
human societies arises over the contribution to and division of personal and shared resources 
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(Ostrom et al. 1999; Dietz et al. 2003) and elucidating the evolutionary explanations for these 
behaviors can help us more effectively manage them (Ostrom et al. 1992; Penn 2003; Janssen et 
al. 2010; Rustagi et al. 2010). 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
1. Model 
 
a. Finding endpoint maxima 
 
We found no intermediate solution to dwy/dy = 0, which means there is no value of y between 0 
and v that maximizes a player’s payoff (i.e. 0<y*<v). Thus, a player’s optimal strategy is to 
contribute either all (y*=v) or none (y*=0) of her resources; that is, y* is an endpoint maximum. 
We determine which of these boundary solutions (y*=0 or v) maximizes a player’s payoff by 
examining dwy/dy: if dwy/dy<0, then the lower boundary gives the fitness maximum; if dwy/dy>0, 
the upper boundary does. We find that dwy/dy = 0 when 
 
 
=1, such that when k>n, players should 
contribute everything (y*=v), and when k<n, they should contribute nothing (y*=0). 
We apply the same procedure to wxyz (i.e. the payoff in game with a tug-of-war) to determine 
which boundary value maximizes a player’s payoff. 
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b. Effectiveness of defending relative to taking resources 
 
The effectiveness of a given investment in resource defense (x*) relative to an investment in 
taking from others (z*) is given by the factor b. We simultaneously solve δwxyz/δx=0 and 
δwxyz/δz=0 for the fitness-maximizing values x* and z* (see main text), and find that: 
 
Equation S1.1 
   
( (   )     )(   ) 
  (   )   (    )   (   )
 
 
   
 (   )  
  (   )   (    )   (   )
 
 
When b=1, these values simplify to the values for x* and z* given in the main text (Equation 
1.5). In addition, note that the numerator of x* is only >0 when b>   
   
. Therefore, if b≤   
   
, the 
optimal strategy is to invest x*=0 in defense, because defending one’s resources is ineffective. If 
b is above this critical value, the optimal investment in defending (x*) relative to taking (z*) is: 
 
Equation S1.2 
  
  
 
 (   )     
 (   )
 
When b=1, this simplifies to  
   
: that is, a player should invest n-1 times more in taking from 
others than in defending. This is because any investment in taking (x*) is spread among the n-1 
other group members (see main text).  
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In order to determine how the relative investments in defending and taking vary with b, we 
evaluate the derivative of Equation S1.2 with respect to b: 
 
Equation S1.3 
  
 
  
  
 
   
  (   )
 
 
Given that n>2, this derivative is always positive, and thus as b increases (that is, resource 
defense increases in effectiveness relative to stealing), a player should increase her investment in 
defense relative to stealing. 
 
2. Comparison of CKTD versus CK experimental conditions 
 
a. Controlling for the number of investment options 
 
In order to control for the extra options in the game with a tug-of-war (CKTD), we can analyze 
people’s contributions relative to the amount they kept for themselves (i.e., amount contributed / 
[amount contributed + amount kept]), as these were the only options they had in both 
experimental conditions. In this analysis of relative contributions, people’s relative contributions 
in the CKTD condition (L$76.1 ± s.e. L$4.0) were even higher than the contributions in the CK 
condition (L$39.0 ± s.e. L$4.6; F(1,24)=55.07, p<0.001). 
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b. Keeping money 
 
In the standard public goods game (CK condition), the amounts people keep for themselves are 
simply whatever they do not contribute to the group. Therefore, if people contribute more when 
there is a tug-of-war (CKTD condition; see main text), this necessarily implies that people keep 
less for themselves in the CKTD condition ($14.3 ± s.e. L$2.0) than in the CK condition (L$61.0 
± s.e. L$4.6; F(1,24)=118.05, p<0.001). 
 
Similarly, if we control for the number of investment options in the CKTD condition by 
analyzing the amount kept relative to the amount contributed (i.e., amount contributed / [amount 
contributed + amount kept]; see section 2a above), the relative amount people keep is 
significantly lower in the CKTD condition (L$23.9 ± s.e. L$4.0; F(1,24)=55.07, p<0.001). 
 
c. Effects of order on contributions in comparison 1 
 
The order of experimental conditions (CKTD first versus CK first) had a significant effect on 
people’s contributions over time (Order x Round interaction: F(9,216)=4.39, p<.001, other 
effects or interactions involving order are all F<1), so we present each order separately below.  
 
When participants played CKTD first, contributions were significantly higher in the CKTD 
condition (L$54.0 ± s.e. L$5.8) than in the CK condition (L$35.9 ± s.e. L$6.6; F(1,12)=7.66, 
p=0.017). There was a significant interaction between experimental condition and round number 
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(F(9,108)=3.72, p<0.001): in the CK condition, contributions fell over time (F(9,108)=6.69, 
p<0.001), whereas contributions did not change in the CKTD condition (F<1, n.s.). 
 
When participants played CK first, contributions were marginally significantly higher in the 
CKTD condition (L$52.8 ± s.e. L$6.5) than in the CK condition (L$42.1 ± s.e. L$6.6; 
F(1,12)=3.40, p=0.090). There was a significant interaction between experimental condition and 
round number (F(9,108)=7.53, p<0.001): in the CK condition, contributions fell over time 
(F(9,108)=3.81, p<0.001), whereas contributions increased in the CKTD condition 
(F(9,108)=5.10, p<0.001).  
 
Thus, despite this interaction, the major results (higher contributions in the CKTD condition, 
contributions falling over time in the CK condition but not the CKTD condition) are 
independently replicated in the two different orders. Order was counterbalanced across sessions, 
with 13 groups playing CKTD first and 13 playing CK first. 
 
3. Taking money and moralistic punishment 
 
One possible explanation for taking money is that it is a form of moralistic punishment towards 
low contributors. This is unlikely to be true for two reasons. Firstly, participants in our 
experiment could not target their taking towards specific people. Secondly, people who took 
more money from others tended to be non-contributors themselves. We tested the latter by 
calculating a “contribution ratio” for each participant based on how much they contributed in the 
CKTD condition relative to how much they kept, i.e. [C/(C+K)]. This automatically controls for 
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the fact that people who take more will naturally have less remaining to contribute. We carried 
out a repeated-measures general linear model to see whether these contribution ratios differed 
between the person in each group who took the most from others, took the second-most from 
others, the third-most, and the least. 
 
If taking is a form of moralistic punishment, then people who take more should have higher 
contribution ratios, because such moralistic punishment is usually carried out by cooperators 
(Fehr and Gächter 2002; Barclay 2006). We did not find this in our experiment; indeed, the 
opposite was true: players who took the most, second-most, third-most, and least in each group 
had average contribution ratios of 0.64 (± s.e. 0.05), 0.68 (± s.e. 0.04), 0.76 (± s.e. 0.04), and 
0.80 (± s.e. 0.04), respectively; the omnibus F-test was significant (F(3,126)=6.62, p<0.001), as 
was the linear contrast (F(1,42)=15.16, p<0.001). Thus, those who took more than their group-
mates also contributed less than their group-mates. Results are very similar if we rank players 
based on how much they spent on taking plus defending (instead of just taking). The order of 
conditions had no effect or significant interactions in either case (all Fs<1).  
 
The results are a little more complicated if we analyze the two experimental contrasts separately 
(CKTD versus CK, and CKTD versus KTD), given that this factor does interact with how much 
a person takes relative to other group members (F(3,126)=7.16, p<0.001). The following results 
are unlikely to be theoretically interesting, but we present them here for completion. When 
participants played the CKTD and KTD conditions, taking was negatively related to the 
contribution ratio, as it was in the above analysis: players who took the most, second-most, third-
most, and least in each group had average contribution ratios of 0.51 (± s.e. 0.07), 0.72 (± s.e. 
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0.06), 0.74 (± s.e. 0.06), and 0.83 (± s.e. 0.04), respectively; the omnibus F-test was significant 
(F(3,54)=12.79, p<0.001), as was the linear contrast (F(1,18)=32.34, p<0.001). The situation was 
different when participants played the CKTD and CK conditions: there were different 
contribution ratios between players who took the most (0.78 ± s.e. 0.06), second-most (0.64 ± 
s.e. 0.06), third-most (0.79 ± s.e. 0.05), and least within each group (0.78 ± s.e. 0.05), 
(F(3,72)=2.75, p=0.049), but these differences were due to quadratic and cubic trends 
(Fs(1,24)=4.39 and 4.85, ps = 0.047 and 0.038, respectively) instead of a linear increase. 
Although this scenario is more complicated, both cases show that people who take more do not 
contribute more, so it is unlikely that taking from others is a form of moralistic punishment.  
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CHAPTER 2 
WITHIN-GROUP COMPETITION REDUCES COOPERATION 
AND PAYOFFS IN HUMAN GROUPS 
 
Jessica L. Barker, Pat Barclay and H. Kern Reeve 
 
Social organisms in many taxa cooperate to produce resources that are shared among group 
members. Some cooperatively produced resources may be monopolized by individuals who 
invest in within-group competition, but these have largely been overlooked in empirical and 
theoretical research on human cooperation, which has focused on non-contestable public goods. 
In this study, we allow for the potential of within-group competition over cooperatively produced 
resources, and use a game theoretic “tug-of-war” model and empirical test to show that such 
competition decreases the degree of cooperation within human groups, and hence decreases 
group members’ payoffs. Our study thus sheds light on how cooperative production and equal 
division of shared resources may have evolved, expands on current models of human cooperation 
to reflect the many natural conditions with opportunities for within-group competition, and 
demonstrates unifying principles in cooperation and competition across the animal kingdom. 
 
Barker JL, Barclay P, Reeve HK. 2012. Within-group competition reduces cooperation and 
payoffs in human groups. Behavioral Ecology 23:735-741. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Social organisms from many taxa, from bacteria  (Rainey and Rainey 2003) to mammals (Packer 
and Ruttan 1988), often share cooperatively produced resources. Some such resources are 
intrinsically non-excludable (public goods, as strictly defined), while others are potentially 
monopolizable by certain group members, who may then gain direct fitness benefits from 
obtaining larger shares relative to other individuals in the group (Williams et al. 2002). Studies 
of cooperation in humans have focused on non-excludable public goods such as clean air or tax-
funded infrastructure, which has led to the implicit assumption that all important group resources 
are automatically divided equally, even when there is the potential for monopolization (Dawes 
1980; Hawkes 1993; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Smith and Bliege Bird 2000; Milinski et al. 2002; 
Barclay 2004). In this study, we relax the assumption of automatic equal resource division in 
human groups by applying the principles of “tug-of-war” models used to analyze conflict in non-
human animals (Reeve et al. 1998; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; Shen and Reeve 2010). Studies 
of within-group competition on humans have examined competition in other contexts, such as 
access to relationships (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Barclay and Willer 2007), but here we provide 
an explicit test of how within-group competition over shared resources affects people’s payoffs 
and levels of cooperation. 
 
Competition over cooperatively produced resources 
 
In this study, we concentrate on cooperatively produced, shared resources that are (a) depletable, 
i.e. if one individual takes more then there is less available for others; (b) contestable, i.e. the size 
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of each individual’s share is not fixed; and (c) subject to a trade-off, due to limited time and 
energy budgets, between cooperative resource production and selfish investment in competition 
to increase the size of one’s own share. Such resources are well documented in non-human 
animal societies: for example, an individual’s share of cooperatively hunted food may be 
determined by contest competition (coatis Nasua narica: Gompper 1996; chimpanzees Pan 
troglodytes: Watts and Mitani 2002, Williams et al. 2002) or dominance rank (salmonid fish 
Oncorhyncus masou macrostomus: Hakoyama and Iguchi 1997; chimpanzees: Fruth and 
Hohmann 2002, Williams et al. 2002). However, investing in cooperation to obtain this food for 
the group may be individually costly (Fruth and Hohmann 2002), reducing an individual’s 
chance of increasing its rank and reproducing in the future, e.g. in social wasps (Polistes 
dominulus: Cant and Field 2001; Liostenogaster flavolineata: Field et al. 2006). Likewise, 
reproductive opportunities may be cooperatively produced (Watts 1998), if individuals can only 
access mates by joining coalitions. This precludes coalition members from investing in other 
activities (Smith et al. 2010), such as competing for a share of the mating opportunities, which 
are often distributed unequally among coalition members, for example in dunnocks Prunella 
modularis (Davies 1992), dolphins Tursiops aduncus (Connor et al. 2001), baboons Papio 
cynocephalus cynocephalus (Noë 1990), dwarf mongooses Helogale parvula (Rood 1990), and 
cheetahs Acinonyx jubatus (Caro and Collins 1987). 
 
Although the balance between cooperation and conflict, and how this balance affects the degree 
of equal sharing, has been a major research focus in the field of behavioral ecology (Vehrencamp 
1983; Keller and Reeve 1994; Sherman et al. 1995), within-group competition over cooperative 
group production has largely been overlooked in studies of human cooperation. In the classic 
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“public goods” economic games typically used to investigate human cooperation in the 
laboratory, equitable division of resource production is usually forced on the players, so there is 
no opportunity for within-group competition (e.g. Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995; Fehr and 
Gächter 2000; Puurtinen and Mappes 2009; Kümmerli et al. 2010). Many potentially contestable 
resources are indeed divided relatively equitably within human groups, for example food in 
hunter-gatherer societies (Kaplan and Hill 1985; Smith and Bliege Bird 2000; Hawkes et al. 
2001). However, in these cases, equal sharing is not automatic, and often results from costly 
enforcement of social institutions (Boehm 1993; Bowles et al. 2003; Gurven 2004) or because 
there are diminishing returns from investment in defending a share that is too large for oneself 
(Blurton Jones 1984). In other cases, there is competition over depletable and non-monopolizable 
resources: male competition over females occurs in hunter-gatherer societies (Knauft 1991), and 
in industrialized nations, there is high competition over possession of resources to produce fuel 
and food (Hardin 1968, 1998; Penn 2003). Many types of social competition have been described 
as “arms races” (Axelrod 1984; Frank 2007), a term which connotes costly investment by 
multiple parties in escalated competition that reduces individuals’ ability to invest in cooperation 
(or indeed anything else) and that is detrimental to all. There is therefore a need to test explicitly 
the effect of within-group competition on cooperation. 
 
Modeling within-group competition over group resources 
 
Within-group competition and variation in resource division can be quantified using game 
theoretic analysis: for example, “tug-of-war” models predict evolutionarily stable energy 
investments in costly competition (Reeve et al. 1998; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; Shen and 
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Reeve 2010). In a simple tug-of-war, resources are divided according to the relative investments 
individuals make in competition and the asymmetry in their competitive efficiency. For example, 
if individual A invests twice as much as individual B in competition over shared resources, and if 
the two individuals have an equal competitive efficiency, then A obtains twice as large a fraction 
of the resources. Tug-of-war models successfully predict both the degree of equitable division of 
resources according to the values of the efficiency parameters and relative competitive 
investments, and how much resource is used up in competition. These models have been applied 
to both small and large societies of invertebrates and vertebrates, such as allodapine bees 
Exoneura nigrescens (Langer et al. 2004), meerkats Suricata suricatta (Clutton-Brock et al. 
2001), lions Panthera leo (Packer et al. 2001) and wood mice Apodemus sylvaticus (Gerlach and 
Bartmann 2002), but tug-of-war theory has not yet been applied explicitly to humans. However, 
because depletable and contestable resources are shared among humans living in groups, and 
because human and non-human coalitionary behaviors are similar (Harcourt and de Waal 1992), 
we expect humans to engage in within-group tug-of-war competition over shared resources, as 
do other animals.  
 
We hypothesize that when faced with choosing how much of one’s own personal resources to (a) 
keep for oneself, (b) cooperatively contribute towards producing group goods, or (c) selfishly 
invest in competing for a larger share of the group goods, people may increase their payoffs by 
investing more in competition relative to the other two options. Given that there is a tradeoff 
between cooperatively contributing to the shared resource and competing for it, we predict that 
when people have the option to engage in within-group competition, (1) people will invest less in 
cooperatively producing the shared resource, and (2) the size of the shared resource will be 
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smaller. We tested these predictions both mathematically, in a game theoretic model, and 
empirically, in a laboratory economic game. 
 
 
MODEL 
 
We first develop a simple model that inserts a tug-of-war into a basic public goods game. Each 
of n group members begins with an amount of personal resource t. Of this resource, individuals 
keep an optimal amount s*, invest an optimal amount z* in competition, and contribute t-s*-z* to 
the group. Contributions are summed and multiplied by k, so there is a collective benefit to 
contributing. This “group productivity” is then divided among all group members according to 
their relative investments in competition (the “tug-of-war”): if any given focal individual invests 
z in competition, and the n-1 other group members invest z*, then the fraction f of group 
productivity that the focal individual obtains is: 
 
Equation 2.1 
  
 
  (   )  
 
 
It is stipulated that if all investments in competition are zero (z and z* = 0), the resource is shared 
equally, as is typically assumed in most human cooperation experiments. 
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This focal individual keeps a fraction s of its personal resource t. Its total payoff (i.e. the sum of 
resources kept for itself plus the share of group productivity obtained through the tug-of-war) is 
therefore: 
 
Equation 2.2 
     (     )  (   )(       )  
 
To find the strategies s and z that maximize an individual’s payoff, we partially differentiate  
Equation 2.2 with respect to s and to z, and set each partial derivative equal to zero. We use the 
second derivative test to verify that these are fitness maxima. The evolutionarily stable solutions 
(Nash equilibria) occur when the fitness maximizing values of s and z are the same as s* and z*. 
The evolutionarily stable solutions to this tug-of-war game depend on the group’s productivity 
relative to its size. If k > n, a group member should invest 
 
Equation 2.3 
   
 (   )
 
 
 
in competition and contribute all of the rest to the group’s shared resources. However, if k < n, 
the individual should keep all of its resources for itself (s* = t; no competition and no 
contribution). 
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We then substitute these fitness-maximizing values for s* and z* into Equation 2.2 to find an 
individual’s payoff at equilibrium. If k > n, a group member obtains a payoff of value kt / n, and 
if k < n, a group member obtains t.  
 
We can now compare this tug-of-war game with a game where individuals cannot invest in 
competition (z and z* = 0), i.e. where group resources are automatically divided equally (a 
classic public goods game). In the automatic equal division game, the optimal solutions are (a) if 
k > n, contribute everything (s* = 0), and obtain a payoff of value kt; (b) if k < n, keep everything 
(s* = t), and therefore obtain a payoff t. 
 
Thus, the effect of including a possible tug-of-war in a classic public goods game, i.e. of players 
having the option to compete over shares of group productivity, is that individuals will (1) be 
less cooperative and (2) obtain lower payoffs than when the resource is automatically equally 
divided. This yields a kind of “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) where the evolutionarily 
stable strategies leave all players worse off (i.e. cannot be invaded by more cooperative 
strategies). Since there is a possibility of a tug-of-war whenever resources are contestable, the 
actual levels of cooperation in nature in such cases are expected to be significantly lower than as 
described by public goods models with automatic resource division.  
 
Importantly, note that although it is never strictly rational to cooperate in our experiment because 
the multiplier k is less than the group size n (k=2 and n=4), we nevertheless predict some non-
zero level of cooperation in both conditions. This is because many empirical studies demonstrate 
that people regularly contribute to group productivity even when k < n and in experimental 
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conditions where there is no incentive to cooperate (Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995; Fehr 
and Gächter 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Barclay 2004). As such, the relevant predictions for 
our experiment are the relative differences between the tug-of-war and equal division games, not 
the absolute contributions or payoffs (Kümmerli et al. 2010). 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Empirical test 
 
We recruited 48 voluntary participants from the Cornell University community (27 females and 
21 males; mean (±s.e.) age: 20.73 ±1.64 years) to play an economic game, programmed using z-
Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Participants played the game in groups of four, and sat at 
computer terminals visually isolated from other group members; they did not know how many 
rounds of the game they would play. All decisions were confidential and only associated with 
code numbers; all methods were approved by the Institutional Review Board for Human 
Participants. Players read an instruction program and completed a quiz to test their understanding 
of the game before they could begin the experiment itself. Participants earned “lab dollars” (L$), 
which were exchangeable to US dollars at a rate of 300:1, plus a baseline payment of US$2. 
Mean (±s.e.) earnings were 9.70 ±1.11 US dollars, depending upon participants’ decisions during 
the game. Each game consisted of two experimental conditions.  
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Equal division condition 
 
Each round, each player received L$100, and decided how much to invest in a “personal fund” 
versus cooperatively contribute to a “group fund” (standard public goods game, e.g. Davis and 
Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Barclay 2004). 
Contributions to the group fund were doubled and redistributed equally among all participants. 
Therefore, each player’s payoff at the end of each round was equal to her investment in the 
personal fund plus one quarter of the doubled group fund. Each player saw a screen at the end of 
each round displaying her payoff and the overall contribution to the “group fund” that round. 
 
Tug-of-war condition 
 
In addition to the options in the equal division game, players could invest any of their L$100 in 
competition over shares of the group fund (termed “extraction” to avoid framing problems). In 
this experimental condition, each individual’s share of the doubled group fund was determined 
by her relative investment in competition: e.g. if players A, B, C and D invested L$10, L$20, 
L$30, and L$40 respectively in competition, then player A got 10/(10+20+30+40) = 1/10 of the 
group fund. If a player invested nothing in competition when others did do so, she did not benefit 
from the group fund; if no players invested in competition, the group fund was split equally. In 
sum, each player’s payoff each round was equal to her investment in her personal fund plus her 
share of the doubled group fund, with shares being determined by relative investments in 
competition (Equation 2.1). At the end of each round, each player saw a screen displaying her 
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payoff, the overall contribution to the “group fund”, and the fraction of the group fund she 
obtained that round. 
 
Statistical analyses 
 
We used a within-subjects design: participants played 10 rounds of each condition, with order of 
conditions counterbalanced between groups. To control for interdependence within groups, we 
treated each group of 4 as an N of 1. We analyzed group contributions using a general linear 
model (SPSS 17.0) with experimental condition (tug-of-war versus equal division) and round (10 
rounds per condition) as within-subjects variables, and with the order of conditions as a between-
subjects variable. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Cooperative contributions to group productivity 
 
Contributions were lower in the tug-of-war than in the equal division condition (F1,10 = 20.83, p 
= 0.001), supporting our prediction. The difference in contributions between the tug-of-war and 
equal division conditions was so robust that it was independently significant in both orders of 
experimental condition (equal division first: F1,5 = 15.4, p = 0.011; tug-of-war first: F1,5 = 7.26, p 
= 0.043; Figure 2.1), and order did not interact with other variables (all Fs < 1.1), such that the 
two orders could even be considered independent replications of each other.
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Figure 2.1. Mean contributions to the group fund out of 100 (± s.e.) when the group fund was 
divided equally (equal division: solid lines) versus divided according to investment in within-
group competition (tug-of-war: dotted lines). Open circles represent groups where the equal 
division condition came first, and closed triangles represent groups where the tug-of-war 
condition came first. Within-subjects error bars were calculated by factoring out individual 
differences in contributions (Cousineau 2005). 
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Consistent with past research in public goods games (e.g. Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995; 
Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Barclay 2004), contributions fell over time (F9,90 
= 12.88, p < 0.001) in both experimental conditions (equal division: F9,90 = 10.73, p < 0.001; tug-
of-war: F9,90 = 5.38, p < 0.001). There was a significant round by condition interaction (F9,90 = 
2.63, p = 0.010): contributions fell more under equal division than under tug-of-war, most likely 
because they had further to fall from. 
 
Controlling for investments in competition 
 
One might argue that contributions were lower in the tug-of-war simply because participants had 
an extra option for investment (i.e., competition), in addition to contribution. To control for 
participants’ having less money available to contribute in the tug-of-war, we analyzed 
contributions as a percentage of the money remaining after investment in competition: we 
divided all contributions by the quantity “100 minus competition”. Under this new analysis, 
contributions (as a proportion of the amount available) were still lower under tug-of-war than 
under equal division (F1,10 = 5.92, p = 0.035; Figure 2.2). This further supports our argument that 
competition decreases cooperation within social groups. Contributions decreased across rounds 
in this new analysis also (F9,90 = 9.90, p < 0.001), but the round by condition interaction was no 
longer significant (F < 1).
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Figure 2.2. Mean contributions to the group fund out of 100 (± s.e.) when the group fund was 
divided equally (equal division: solid line) versus divided according to investment in within-
group competition (tug-of-war: dotted line). The dashed line represents contributions in the tug-
of-war as a percentage of the amount remaining after investing in within-group competition. All 
three lines display data both from groups where the equal division condition came first and from 
those where the tug-of-war came first. Within-subjects error bars were calculated by factoring 
out individual differences in contributions (Cousineau 2005). 
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Amount kept 
 
An alternative hypothesis for the decreased contribution in the tug-of-war condition is that 
participants were confused by more options being available: for example, participants may have 
experimented with both options (keeping and competition) and responded by keeping money 
instead of contributing it. If this is true, we should see participants keeping more money for 
themselves in the tug-of-war condition than under equal division. Instead, the opposite was true: 
participants actually kept more money for themselves in the equal division condition than under 
tug-of-war (means (±s.e.) for equal division: 63.8 ±6.5; for tug-of-war: 55.9 ±6.9, F1,11 = 6.54, p 
= 0.027), which falsifies this hypothesis. In addition to testing participants’ understanding before 
they started the experiment, we asked participants in an anonymous post-experiment 
questionnaire whether the instructions had been clear and what strategies they adopted during the 
game; 91% of players indicated that they completely understood the instructions. Thus, the lower 
contributions in the tug-of-war condition are better explained as being a result of the competition 
rather than being due to confusion. 
 
Payoffs 
 
Players’ payoffs (i.e., total earnings in the game from investment in the personal fund plus shares 
of the group fund) were higher in the equal division condition than in the tug-of-war (mean 
earnings (±s.e.) in L$: equal division: 1362.79 ±65.29; tug-of-war: 916.54 ±16.00; paired t11 = 
6.71, p < 0.001; Figure 2.3), as predicted. If all participants had contributed everything in every 
round of a given condition, each participant would have earned L$2000 (US$6.67, excluding 
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Figure 2.3. Mean payoffs (± s.e.)  in lab dollars at the end of each experimental treatment (i.e. 
after 10 rounds). Within-subjects error bars were calculated by factoring out individual 
differences in contributions (Cousineau 2005). 
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US$2 baseline payment); if all players kept all their money, each player would have earned 
$1000 (US$3.33, excluding US$2 baseline payment). In the tug-of-war, people expended 
resources in competition, rather than contributing towards production of the shared group 
resource, and thus players did worse overall than if they had simply kept all their money (one-
sample t11 = 5.28, p < 0.001). 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The tug-of-war model predicted that the option to invest in competition over group productivity 
leads to people (a) contributing less and (b) obtaining lower payoffs. The results of the 
experimental game support both of these predictions. The decrease in cooperation in the tug-of-
war condition could not be explained by participants simply withholding more money or having 
less available to contribute, but instead arose from participants contributing a smaller relative 
amount to group productivity. These experimental results reflect many situations outside the 
laboratory where competition over real-life resources may reduce cooperative production and 
hence individuals’ payoffs. For example, parties in dispute over land may spend money in a 
military arms race, instead of spending money on using the land to produce resources that can 
then be shared; rivals for the leadership of a political party may harm their party’s chances of 
electoral success by engaging in fierce within-party competition; and if academic collaborators 
put time and energy into contesting first authorship, they may produce a lower quality 
collaborative project than if they devoted all of their resources to the project itself. In some non-
human primates, the mere potential for resource monopolizability, regardless of whether it is 
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realized, can reduce cooperation in laboratory tasks (brown capuchins Cebus apella: de Waal and 
Davis 2003; chimpanzees: Melis et al. 2006). 
 
Given the parameters in our experiment, notably with k<n, the model predicted that the optimal 
decision is to keep all of one’s own resources, regardless of the potential for competition. 
However, people still contributed in both experimental conditions in our laboratory game, 
despite not having any incentive for cooperation, such as between-group competition (Bornstein 
and Ben-Yossef 1994; Puurtinen and Mappes 2009) or reputation (Yamagishi 1986; Nowak and 
Sigmund 1998). Classic “public goods games,” which by default have equal division, have 
yielded the same results in this regard (e.g. Davis and Holt 1993; Ledyard 1995; Fehr and 
Gächter 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Barclay 2004). Players’ suboptimal decisions may simply 
be because people avoid extreme options in laboratory games, regardless of whether they are 
optimal (Kümmerli et al. 2010) or due to unconscious concerns about reputation (Haley and 
Fessler 2005; Burnham and Hare 2007). In order to control for this, each participant in our 
experiment played both experimental conditions: the relevant results are therefore contributions 
in one condition relative to the other, and the absolute values are not important. 
 
Effects of competition on cooperation and productivity 
 
In a tug-of-war model, the amount of group resources that each individual obtains is a product of 
(a) the total pool of resources produced by the group, and (b) the fraction of this total that each 
individual obtains relative to other group members; these are determined by within-group 
cooperation and between-group competition (West et al. 2006; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007) and 
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within-group competition (Reeve et al. 1998; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; Shen and Reeve 2010) 
respectively. An individual can maximize its payoff by free-riding on others’ contributions to 
group productivity, and, if there is the potential for competition, by investing more in 
competition relative to other group members at the expense of contributing. This is likely to 
result in an arms race of escalating competitive investments (Axelrod 1984; Frank 2007), the 
intensity of which may vary depending on the abundance and monopolizability of group 
resources, such as cooperatively hunted meat (Blurton Jones 1984; Bliege Bird and Bird 1997). 
Due to the trade-off between competition and cooperation, this reduces group productivity and 
thus may lead to a “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968; Rankin et al. 2007), leaving all 
group members worse off than if none had invested in competition. Individuals in these 
competitive groups will have lower fitness than individuals in groups with higher cooperation 
(Reeve and Hölldobler 2007; Wilson and Wilson 2007), such that each individual would 
individually benefit from suppression of competition (West et al. 2006). 
 
Given the significant reduction in people’s payoffs in the tug-of-war condition in our experiment, 
we predict selection for mechanisms to reduce within-group competitive conflict and increase the 
relative benefit of within-group cooperation (Ratnieks and Reeve 1992; Bowles et al. 2003; 
Bowles 2006; West et al. 2006). This prediction may explain the fact that many contestable and 
depletable resources outside the laboratory are, in practice, usually shared equally, for example 
big game in hunter-gatherer societies (Knauft 1991; Hawkes 1993; Smith and Bliege Bird 2000). 
However, this egalitarianism is not necessarily cost-free and automatic, but may be enforced 
(Boehm 1999). Allowing for within-group competition may thus provide insight into why there 
was selection for equitable division of potentially contestable resources. We suggest that (1) 
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equitable division was preceded by high within-group competition, since individuals benefit by 
escalating their competitive investments relative to other group members, and (2) the detrimental 
effect of this competition allowed selection for “individually costly, group beneficial” (Bowles et 
al. 2003) suppression mechanisms, via genetic selection or via cultural evolution and the 
differential survival of cultural norms (Boyd and Richerson 2009).  
 
These mechanisms may include policing (Frank 1995; Frank 2003; El Mouden et al. 2010) or 
social institutions such as monogamy and food sharing norms (Bowles et al. 2003) and self-
government (Ostrom et al. 1992), but will likely differ in different societies and for different 
resources. Across cultures, one might predict (1) less investment in and reliance on 
cooperatively-produced resources if those shared resources are contestable, or need to be 
competed over because they are in short supply; (2) higher cooperation in experimental 
economic games in cultural groups habitually exposed to contestable shared resources than in 
groups exposed to non-contestable resources; and (3) greater investment and reliance on 
cooperative resources in species or cultural groups that have mechanisms for equal sharing. 
Future research should investigate the variation in resource competition and suppression 
mechanisms both among and within cultures. In addition, since payoffs may be more inequitable 
when there is more within-group competition, our results suggest that there may be selection for 
reproductive leveling mechanisms to reduce fitness differences among group members, an idea 
which has not been explicitly tested in humans (Bowles 2006). 
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Summary 
 
This study demonstrated mathematically and empirically the detrimental effect of within-group 
competition on individuals’ cooperation, and therefore their payoffs. The novel result that a 
within-group tug-of-war can lead to a tragedy of the commons may explain why many human 
groups have evolved mechanisms to ensure contestable resources are shared equally (Knauft 
1991; Boehm 1999; Bowles 2006). Allowing for the potential of within-group competition in 
laboratory games lets us model a broader range of natural situations more accurately, an 
important goal in the study of human cooperation (Janssen et al. 2010). Additionally, 
acknowledging competition within human groups helps us draw parallels with the dynamics of 
cooperation and conflict in non-human social animals (Harcourt and de Waal 1992), and 
suggests that the trade-off between competition and cooperation is likely a universal principle 
across the animal kingdom (de Waal and Davis 2003). Finally, given that human competition 
(and hence lack of cooperation) over depletable resources such as oil, cod stocks, and clean 
water from irrigation systems (Hardin 1968; Hardin 1998; Ostrom et al. 1999; Dietz et al. 2003; 
Penn 2003) has led to many current environmental problems, we suggest that recognizing the 
need to reduce this competition will allow more effective management of these issues. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERGROUP COMPETITION AND THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN COOPERATION 
AND CONFLICT: TESTING THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS IN PAPER WASPS 
 
Jessica L. Barker and H. Kern Reeve 
 
Intergroup competition is theoretically predicted to favor increased cooperation within social 
groups. There is much empirical support for this in human and non-human vertebrate societies, 
but although intergroup competition has been proposed as an explanation for “superorganism”-
like insect colonies, it has not explicitly been tested in eusocial insects. In addition, a common 
assumption in studies of cooperation and conflict in social groups is that all effort not expended 
in within-group competition is invested in cooperation; this is not the case in many societies, 
where individuals may benefit by conserving resources for future reproduction. In this study, we 
relax this assumption of a direct tradeoff, and generate alternative game theoretic predictions of 
the effect of intergroup competition on within-group competition and cooperation. We tested 
these predictions experimentally in the primitively eusocial paper wasp Polistes dominulus. In a 
field experiment, we found that workers’ nest departure rate, aggression rate and nest activity 
increased when we transplanted nests closer together. In the lab, nests paired with a competing 
nest did not increase or decrease their aggression, foraging or activity levels, but the relationships 
between these behaviors were different. In the absence of a competing nest, a change in 
aggression within a nest over time was positively correlated with a change in foraging rate, and 
negatively correlated with a change in activity. However, in the presence of a competing nest, a 
change in aggression is positively correlated with a change in activity. These results do not give 
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full support for the predictions, but do imply that there is not a direct tradeoff between 
cooperation and aggression, and that aggression may be used to regulate foraging when 
intergroup competition is low. This finding suggests that within-group aggression may not 
signify within-group conflict, as is often assumed.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The evolution of cooperation is a major focus in behavioral ecology (Dugatkin 1997), with the 
major theoretical explanations being indirect (Hamilton 1964) and reciprocal (Trivers 1971; 
Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) fitness benefits. These explanations involve within-group 
interactions, but another important class of explanations concern interactions between groups in 
a population. The idea that intergroup competition affects within-group cooperation has arisen in 
many disciplines, from social psychology (Tajfel 1982; Bornstein 2003) and anthropology 
(Manson and Wrangham 1991) to economics (Hausken 2000). In brief, intergroup competition 
increases the net benefit to an individual of cooperating with group members, relative to the 
benefit of cooperation in the absence of intergroup competition. This explanation is consistent 
with both individual selection and kin selection (Dugatkin and Reeve 1994; West et al. 2011); it 
requires that the individuals benefit as well as the group to which they belong, but does not 
require relatedness among group members to be high (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). There is 
abundant and diverse support for this theory: much from non-human vertebrates, e.g. green 
woodhoopoes Phoeniculus purpureus (Radford 2008; Radford 2011), capuchins Cebus 
capucinus (Perry 1996), and chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes (Wilson and Wrangham 2003; Muller 
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and Mitani 2005), but also from bacteria (Brockhurst et al. 2007) and even intraorganismal 
interactions among sperm (Fisher and Hoekstra 2010). However, the majority of studies focus on 
humans: intergroup competition may have been important in ancestral human evolution (Bowles 
2006; Bowles 2009), and evidence for humans’ responses to competing groups is widespread, 
from laboratory public goods games (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef 1994; Puurtinen and Mappes 
2009) and field experiments (Sherif et al. 1954) to anthropological studies (Richerson and Boyd 
1999). 
 
Some of the most striking instances of cooperation occur in insect societies (Wilson 1971; Reeve 
and Hölldobler 2007; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009), for example advanced eusocial species with 
morphologically distinct queen and worker castes (Bourke 1999). These “superorganism”-like 
properties (Wilson and Sober 1989; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009) may be due to intergroup 
competition (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). In a game theoretic model to explain the evolution of 
extreme levels of cooperation in advanced insect societies, Reeve and Hölldobler (2007) show 
that “tug-of-war” competition between groups favors cooperation within groups, and predict that 
cooperation increases when the number of competing groups increases, the intensity of between-
group competition relative to within-group competition increases, and the relatedness between 
individuals in different groups decreases (summarized in Table 3.1). There is experimental 
evidence that competition between interspecific colonies affects cooperation in the termites 
Cryptotermes secundus and C. domesticus (Korb and Foster 2010), and intergroup competition 
has been invoked as an explanation for cooperative foraging specialization in queens of 
Acromyrmex versicolor ants (Rissing et al. 1989), but the predictions of Reeve and Hölldobler’s 
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(2007) “nested tug-of-war” model have not been explicitly empirically tested within a social 
insect species. 
 
In their model, Reeve and Hölldobler (2007) propose that their decision variable f*, an 
individual’s investment in within-group conflict, provides a metric for “superorganismness”. 
Within-group conflict (equivalently, within-group competition) comprises any behavior that 
increases an individual’s share of resources relative to others’ in its group. This is the only 
decision variable in the model, which thereby assumes that all personal resources not invested in 
within-group competition are cooperatively contributed to group productivity (1-f*). Cooperation 
comprises any behavior that increases group productivity relative to other groups; thus, the total 
cooperative contributions of all group members comprise that group’s investment in between-
group competition.  
 
However, investment in within-group competition versus cooperation is not necessarily a zero-
sum decision: some groups exhibit both high conflict and high cooperation (Queller and 
Strassmann 2009). In particular, in many cooperatively breeding species, individuals may benefit 
not by competing over current breeding opportunities, but by waiting in a “reproductive queue” 
for the opportunity to breed (Wiley and Rabenold 1984; Kokko and Johnstone 1999; Field and 
Cant 2009). This is the case in vertebrates such as superb fairy wrens Malurus cyaneus 
(Cockburn et al. 2008), and in many primitively social insects such as Polistes paper wasps (Cant 
and Field 2001; Cant et al. 2006) and Liostenogaster hover wasps (Field et al. 2006; Field 2008). 
Thus, a more realistic model of intergroup competition should include a third option of keeping 
resources. This 3-option model can be generalized to societies in which workers do not 
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reproduce in the future: in this scenario, one would expect it to predict an optimal investment of 
zero in keeping resources.  
 
In this study, we extend Reeve and Hölldobler’s (2007) model to include the third option of 
keeping resources, which yields two nested tradeoffs.  Firstly, there is a tradeoff between 
increasing future reproductive opportunities, by conserving their personal resources, and 
increasing current reproductive opportunities, by investing their personal resources in tug-of-war 
competition and/or in contributing to group productivity. Secondly, when investing in current 
reproduction, there is a tradeoff between investing in within-group competition for a share of 
resources versus cooperating to obtain more resources to be shared, as in the original nested tug-
of-war model (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). We hypothesize that individuals’ optimal 
investments in cooperation and conflict depend on the relative importance of future reproduction 
and on the nature of the shared resources, and that these factors may interact with intergroup 
competition. We derive game theoretic “tug-of-war” (Reeve et al. 1998; Reeve and Hölldobler 
2007) alternative predictions for the effect of intergroup competition on cooperation and conflict. 
Using a strong inference approach (Platt 1964), we conduct an empirical test in the primitively 
social wasp Polistes dominulus to falsify these predictions. 
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MODEL 
 
Constructing the 3-option model 
 
Each individual has a personal energy store of size t, of which it invests an optimal fraction f* in 
competing with group members for shared resources (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). Additionally, 
each individual contributes an optimal fraction h* towards group productivity (increasing the 
size of the shared resources), and keeps the remaining fraction 1-f*-h* for itself. 
 
We seek the evolutionarily stable pair of strategies f* and h*, and start by considering a focal 
individual who adopts the mutant strategies f and h, instead of f* and h*. (We assume that f and h 
are encoded by a single allele, or pair of tightly linked alleles, although the results of the model 
are the same if we consider two focal individuals, one carrying a mutant allele for f and the other 
carrying a mutant allele for h.) The focal individual is in a group of size n, and other group 
members have a probability r of also carrying the mutant allele(s). The focal’s group is in a 
population of ng groups, competing in a “tug-of-war” (Reeve et al. 1998; Reeve and Hölldobler 
2007) over a resource of value v. 
 
Firstly, we find the fraction of shared resources that the focal individual obtains within its group. 
This fraction w is determined by the ratio of the focal individual’s investment in within-group 
competition relative to the sum of all group members’ competitive investments (where x=ft and 
x*=f*t), for a given intensity z of within-group competition (Reeve et al. 1998; Reeve and 
Hölldobler 2007):  
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Equation 3.1 
  
  
   (   )(    (   )   )
 
 
Secondly, we find the fraction of the population resource v that the focal individual’s group 
obtains. This is determined by the group members’ total contributions c to group productivity 
(where y=ht, y*=h*t, and j is a constant): 
 
Equation 3.2a 
   (  (   )(   (   )  )) 
 
The total group contribution to group productivity of a group with no mutants is: 
 
Equation 3.2b 
        
 
The fraction b that the focal individual’s group obtains is given by its members’ contributions to 
productivity c relative to all other groups’ (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). With probability rg, 
individuals in another group possess the mutant allele(s); thus, for an intensity of between-group 
competition q, the focal individual’s group obtains a fraction: 
 
Equation 3.3 
  
  
   (    )(     (    )  
 )
 
77 
 
Thirdly, we construct an expression for the focal individual’s fitness. This is given by the amount 
of resources it obtains in the tug-of-war competition plus the amount of resources it has kept for 
itself; that is, we incorporate both current and future reproduction. The extent to which an 
individual values future resources relative to current resources (e.g. due to the probability of 
surviving to use future resources) is given by the factor vf: 
 
Equation 3.4 
      (     ) 
 
Finally, to find the strategies f* and h* that maximize an individual’s fitness, we calculate the 
partial derivatives of fitness with respect to f and h (
  
  
 and 
  
  
). At the fitness maximum, both of 
these partial derivatives are equal to zero, f=f*, and h=h*. We thus simultaneously solve these 
expressions for f* and h*, and verify that they are fitness maxima by checking that the second 
derivatives are negative. 
 
We obtain the following stable solutions for the investment in within-group competition, 
contribution, and keeping resources respectively: 
Equation 3.5 
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We can thus predict how a change in any parameter (n, ng, r, rg, z, q, v, vf and t) affects an 
individual’s evolutionarily stable investments in f*, h* and 1-f*-h* (Table 3.1). 
 
Resources proportional to population size 
 
In the above model, the population resource over which groups are competing has a fixed value 
v. However, v may vary with the size of the population, for example when individuals are in an 
ideal free distribution (Kennedy and Gray 1993). In this case, we have: 
 
Equation 3.6 
        
 
where k is a constant. We substitute this expression for v into the fitness function, and repeat the 
steps above in order to obtain the following evolutionarily stable investments in within-group 
competition, cooperation, and keeping resources:  
 
Equation 3.7 
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Again, we can predict how a change in any of the above parameters changes individuals’ optimal 
investments in competition, cooperation and keeping when the population resource is a function 
of the population size (Table 3.1). 
 
Reeve and Hölldobler’s (2007) 2-option model 
 
In the nested tug-of-war model (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007), the only decision variable is f*, an 
individual’s investment in within-group competition; thus an individual contributes 1-f* to group 
productivity. For comparison, using the notation above, these solutions in the Reeve and 
Hölldobler (2007) model are: 
 
Equation 3.8 
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As for the two versions of the 3-option model (fixed v, and v proportional to population size), the 
effect on these strategies of changing the different parameters (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007) is 
summarized in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1. Comparison of predictions made by the different models of intergroup competition: an 
increase in each of the parameters in the left-hand column results in an increase (↑), decrease (↓), 
or no change (0) in the evolutionarily stable strategies f*, h* and 1-f*-h*. 
ng = number of competing groups; n = number of individuals in a group; r = within-group 
relatedness; rg = between-group relatedness; z = intensity of within-group competition; 
q=intensity of between-group competition; t = each individual’s starting amount of resources. 
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Comparing the models’ predictions 
 
There are thus three sets of testable predictions for how groups will respond to changes in each 
parameter (Table 3.1); we focus here on those concerning changes in between-group 
competition. When the number of competing groups ng increases: (1) both the Reeve and 
Hölldobler (2007) and fixed-v models predict a decrease in within-group competition, but the 
population-v model predicts no change; (2) both the Reeve and Hölldobler (2007) and 
population-v models predict an increase in within-group cooperation, but the fixed-v model 
predicts a decrease; (3) the fixed-v model predicts an increase in the amount of personal 
resources kept for oneself, but the population-v model predicts a decrease. Thus, for any change 
in ng, each model predicts a different relationship between the changes in individuals’ 
investments in within-group competition, cooperation, and keeping resources. We 
experimentally tested these predictions about the absolute changes in these investments, and the 
relationships between them, in the paper wasp Polistes dominulus, by manipulating the number 
of competing nests in the field and the laboratory. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Study species 
 
The primitively eusocial wasp Polistes dominulus is a model system for studying cooperation 
and conflict (Reeve 2001; Field and Cant 2006), given its flexible social structure (Reeve 1991) 
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and easily observable cooperative and selfish behaviors: for example, foraging is costly to the 
forager but benefits all other group members (cooperative), and aggression towards wasps of 
adjacent dominance rank may increase the aggressor’s chances of becoming more dominant 
(selfish). In addition, this species is especially suitable for this study, for two reasons: firstly, 
conserving resources for future reproduction is an important component of fitness in this species 
(Leadbeater et al. 2011); and secondly, nests occur in large populations where wasps frequently 
encounter conspecifics from other nests (Zanette and Field 2011), and thus are likely to 
experience intergroup competition. 
 
In temperate Polistes species, such as P. dominulus, mated females establish nests in the spring, 
either solitarily or in multiple-foundress associations (Reeve 1991). In the latter case, the 
dominant foundress lays eggs, while the subordinates wait in a “reproductive queue” to inherit 
the breeding position (Field and Cant 2006; Field and Cant 2009). An individual’s rank in the 
queue, and thus her probability of future direct fitness benefits, affects her optimal levels of 
within-group competition to increase her dominance rank (Cant et al. 2006) and cooperative 
contribution to group productivity (Cant and Field 2001). Additionally, some foundresses gain 
direct fitness by adopting other nests, and those following this “sit-and-wait” tactic conserve 
more energy than do other foundresses (Starks 1998). 
 
The first adults to emerge tend to become workers, while gynes emerge later in the season 
(Reeve 1991). However, there are no morphological differences between gynes and workers 
(Reeve 1991), and some early workers leave the nest in order to attempt to become foundresses 
the next spring (Reeve et al. 1998) and tend to be more selfish, foraging less and spending less 
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time active (Tibbetts 2007). Thus, the trade-off between investing in current fitness and future 
fitness applies to workers as well as foundresses. 
 
Field experiment 
 
Manipulation 
 
We experimentally manipulated intergroup competition by transplanting 32 P. dominulus 
colonies. All nests were originally found on and transplanted between buildings of the Liddell 
Field Station near Ithaca, New York, and were in the early worker phase (late June – early July 
2007); we transplanted nests randomly with respect to size and original location. Post-transplant 
locations were grossly categorized into high and low nest density (high and low intergroup 
competition respectively): in the former category, we transplanted nests close together, and left 
non-experimental colonies on the buildings, while in the latter, we removed all non-experimental 
colonies, and transplanted colonies further apart (Figure 3.1a). However, distances between nests 
varied within each category, and thus we analyzed nearest neighbor distance as a continuous 
variable. (Post-transplant nearest neighbor distances were within the range we observed for pre-
transplant nests: see appendix.) We also removed all adults (foundresses and workers) already on 
the nest, with the result that any individuals on the post-transplant nests would have emerged in 
that location and not have experienced the pre-transplant location. None of these nests were 
adopted by other foundresses (all foundresses in the population had been marked earlier in the 
season).
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(a) 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Set-up of field and lab experiments. (a) In the field, we transplanted 8 nests to low 
density areas, where we removed all non-experimental colonies, and 16 nests to high density 
areas; in the latter, non-experimental colonies remained on the buildings, and we transplanted 
experimental colonies in clusters. (b) In the lab, we put each nest in its own box with food and 
water. In 4 treatment pairs, we removed the partition separating the two colonies (exposure to 
intergroup competition), while in 4 control pairs, the partition remained throughout the 
experiment (no intergroup competition). 
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Observations and statistical analyses 
 
Starting one week after the transplants, after new workers had begun to emerge, we recorded at 
least two hours of video observations of each nest (n=23, excluding nests that were depredated or 
otherwise failed after the transplants). We scored all aggressive behaviors (darts and lunges; no 
other aggressive behaviors identified), and calculated the rates per individual per hour. We used 
the rate of nest departures per individual per hour as a proxy for cooperative foraging effort, 
given that leaving the nest is costly (Cant and Field 2001). We also recorded nest activity levels 
every five minutes as the percentage of wasps that were active. 
 
To ensure that the residuals in the statistical models were normally distributed, we transformed 
aggressive acts and departures as log10(1+rate) (Tibbetts and Reeve 2000), and log10-transformed 
the percentage of active wasps and nearest neighbor distances. Neither nest size (at the time of 
transplant or at the time of observation) nor the time between transplant and observation was 
correlated with nearest neighbor distance (all p>0.2). Thus, we excluded nest size and time from 
the below analyses, and performed partial Pearson correlations controlling for temperature. 
 
Laboratory experiment 
 
Manipulation 
 
We collected 16 early worker phase P. dominulus nests from Liddell Field Station buildings, and 
transplanted them into the laboratory in July 2008. We gave every wasp a nest-specific paint 
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mark on her thorax, and housed each nest individually in a cardboard box, approximately 900 
cm
3
, with a transparent plastic front for viewing. Each nest had access to construction paper for 
nest-building, ad libitum water and honey-water mixture, and a fixed number of mealworms 
proportional to the size of the nest. We randomly assigned nests to pairs, and randomly assigned 
4 pairs to a control group and 4 pairs to a treatment group. In the experimental manipulation, we 
cut down the cardboard wall separating the two colonies in each pair of treatment nests; for the 
control nests, we cut and immediately replaced the wall (Figure 3.1b). Thus, after the 
manipulation, wasps on a control nest remained in an isolated box, while wasps on a treatment 
nest were potentially in competition with the other treatment nest in the pair. 
 
Observations and statistical analyses 
 
We recorded two hours of video observations of each nest before and after the experimental 
manipulation. One nest in the control treatment failed, and thus we had n=7 control nests and 
n=8 treatment nests. We scored activity levels and aggressive behaviors as in the field 
experiment. Given that wasps in the lab frequently left the nest for a few seconds without 
attempting to bring back food (J. L. Barker, personal observation), we did not use departure rate 
as a measure of foraging effort, as we did in the field experiment. Instead, we used two 
alternative measures of foraging: (1) rate of returns to the nest (per individual per hour) with 
visible food items (caterpillar or nectar droplet), and (2) proportion of wasps off the nest, given 
that individuals not on the nest tended to cluster around the food (J. L. Barker, personal 
observation), and that in many cases we could not detect whether a wasp was returning with food 
or not. All nests in the lab experienced the same constant temperature, and we recorded videos of 
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all nests synchronously; thus we exclude temperature and time since transplant from the 
analyses. 
 
We examined whether behavior on each nest differed after the experimental manipulation, using 
t-tests for normally distributed data and Wilcoxon rank sum tests for non-normally distributed 
data. Firstly, we compared pre- and post-manipulation behavior within a given nest (paired tests). 
Secondly, we calculated the percentage changes in aggression, activity, wasps off the nest and 
returns with food by subtracting the pre-manipulation value from the post-manipulation value for 
each nest, and finding this as a percentage of the pre-manipulation value. We determined 
whether these changes were significant (one-sample tests), and whether they differed between 
treatments and controls (unpaired tests). 
 
Additionally, given that group size may affect investments in within-group cooperation and 
conflict (Table 3.1), we investigated whether the number of wasps on the nest affected the 
percentage change in behaviors, using Pearson correlations for data whose residuals were 
normally distributed and Spearman rank correlations for those with non-normal residuals. We 
also tested whether the change in each behavior was correlated with changes in the other 
behaviors, since the different models predict different relationships between these changes 
(Table 3.1). We used Pearson correlations for data whose residuals were normally distributed 
and Spearman rank correlations for those with non-normal residuals, and Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformation to determine whether these correlations were significantly different between 
treatments and controls.  
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RESULTS 
 
Field experiment 
 
Departure rates, aggression rates, and the proportion of active wasps were all negatively 
correlated with nearest neighbor distances (log10-transformed data, partial correlations 
controlling for temperature; departure rates: r= -0.4368, p= 0.0299; aggression rates: r= -0.5193, 
p= 0.0066; proportion of active wasps: r= -0.4778, p= 0.0150). That is, when nests were closer 
together, wasps were more active, departed more frequently, and were more aggressive to 
nestmates (Figure 3.2). 
 
Laboratory experiment 
 
Differences before and after manipulation 
 
There were no significant differences between pre- and post-manipulation control or treatment 
nests in (i) aggression rate, (ii) proportion of active wasps, (iii) proportion of wasps off the nest, 
or (iv) rate of returning to nest with food items (paired t and Wilcoxon rank sum tests; all p>0.1). 
None of the percentage changes in each of these behaviors was significantly different from zero 
(one-sample t and Wilcoxon rank sum tests; all p>0.1; Figure 3.3). These changes were not 
significantly different between treatments and controls (unpaired t and Wilcoxon rank sum tests; 
all p>0.1). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Nest proximity had a significantly negative effect on the (a) rate of departures (r= -
0.4368, p= 0.0299), (b) rate of aggression (r= -0.5193, p= 0.0066), and (c) percentage of wasps 
that were active(r= -0.4778, p= 0.0150). Nest proximity is given by nearest neighbor distance 
(NND), and rates are calculated per hour per individual on the nest.  
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Figure 3.3. There were no significant changes in any behaviors during the experiment, and no 
significant differences between control and treatment nests. Changes are given as the difference 
between the post-manipulation and pre-manipulation value as a percentage of the pre-
manipulation value. 
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Nest size 
 
Nest size was not significantly correlated with changes in (i) aggression rate, (ii) proportion of 
active wasps, (iii) proportion of wasps off the nest, or (iv) rate of returning to nest with food 
items, in either treatments or controls (Pearson correlations; all p>0.15). In post-manipulation 
treatment nests, the relative difference in size between focal and competing nests (calculated as 
[size of focal minus size of competitor] as a percentage of the size of the focal nest) was non-
significantly correlated with the change in proportion of wasps off the nest (Spearman rank 
correlation: ρ=0.6976, p=0.0544), but not with the rate of returns with food, rate of aggression, 
or proportion of active wasps (all p>0.4). 
 
Partial correlations between changes in aggression, foraging and activity (Table 3.2) 
 
The change in activity was negatively correlated with the change in aggression in control nests, 
controlling for either returns with food (r=-0.9512, p<0.0001) or proportion of wasps off the nest 
(ρ=-0.7749, p=0.0142). In treatments, however, the change in activity was positively correlated 
with the change in aggression (controlling for returns with food: r=0.7236, p=0.0191; non-
significant when controlling for proportion off nest: r=0.5489, p=0.1421). The correlations in 
treatments were significantly different to the correlations in controls (controlling for returns with 
food: z=-4.11, p<0.0001; controlling for proportion off nest: z=-2.46, p=0.0139). 
 
The change in activity was positively correlated with the change in returns with food, controlling 
for aggression, in controls (r= 0.9717, p<0.0001) and non-significantly in treatments (r=0.6259, 
93 
 
Table 3.2. Partial correlations between changes in behaviors in control and treatment colonies in 
the lab (Pearson correlations for variables with normally distributed residuals; otherwise, 
Spearman rank correlations). Fisher’s r-to-z transformation tests whether the correlation 
coefficients for controls and treatments are significantly different (n.s. = non-significant). 
 
Partial correlation between 
changes in: 
Controlling 
for change 
in: 
Control Treatment Different in 
control and 
treatment? 
Activity Aggression Returns with 
food 
Negative 
r=-0.9512 
p<0.0001 
Positive 
r=0.7236 
p=0.0191 
Yes 
z=-4.11 
p<0.0001 
Activity Aggression Proportion off 
nest 
Negative 
ρ=-0.7749 
p=0.0142 
n.s. 
r=0.5489 
p=0.1421 
Yes 
z=-2.46 
p=0.0139 
Aggression Returns with 
food 
Activity Positive 
r=0.9495 
p<0.0001 
n.s. 
r=-0.4168 
p=0.3053 
Yes 
z=3.39 
p=0.0007 
Aggression Proportion off 
nest 
Activity n.s. 
ρ=0.6965 
p=0.0522 
n.s. 
r=-0.1520 
p=0.7309 
n.s. 
z=1.51 
p=0.131 
Activity Returns with 
food 
Aggression Positive 
r= 0.9717 
p<0.0001 
n.s. 
r=0.6259 
p=0.0727 
Yes 
z=2.07 
p=0.0385 
Activity Proportion off 
nest 
Aggression n.s. 
r=0.1023 
p=0.8370 
Positive 
r=0.7356 
p=0.0152 
n.s. 
z=-1.25 
p=0.2113 
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p=0.0727); these correlations were significantly different (z=2.07, p=0.0385). The change in 
activity was also positively correlated with the change in the proportion of wasps off the nest, 
controlling for aggression (non-significant in controls: r=0.1023, p=0.8370; treatments: 
r=0.7356, p=0.0152), but there was no significant difference between controls and treatments 
(z=-1.25, p=0.2113). 
 
The change in aggression was positively correlated in controls with the changes in returns with 
food (r=0.9495, p<0.0001) and proportion of wasps off the nest (non-significant: ρ=0.6965, 
p=0.0522), controlling for aggression. These correlations were non-significantly negative in 
treatments (returns with food: r=-0.4168, p=0.3053; proportion of wasps off the nest: r=-0.1520, 
p=0.7309). The correlations involving returns with food were significantly different in treatments 
and controls (z=3.39, p=0.0007) but those involving the proportion of wasps off the nest were 
not (z=1.51, p=0.131). 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Theoretical predictions and empirical results 
 
The game theoretic models give three alternative sets of predictions about the changes in wasps’ 
cooperation and conflict with changes in between-group competition. When the number of 
competing groups, ng, increases, as in our experimental manipulations, Reeve and Hölldobler’s 
(2007) nested tug-of-war model predicts that cooperation increases and within-group competition 
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decreases, the 3-option fixed-v model predicts that both cooperation and within-group 
competition decrease, and the 3-option population-v model predicts that cooperation increases 
and aggression does not change. Our empirical results do not fully support any of these 
predictions: in the field study, on-nest aggression, foraging and nest activity increased when 
nests were transplanted closer together; while in the lab study, there was no change in 
aggression, foraging or activity when colonies were exposed to a competing group. However, 
correlations between changes in aggression, activity and foraging in the lab suggest that there 
may be effects of intergroup competition not predicted by the models. 
 
Increases in both on-nest aggression and foraging in the transplanted nests in the field 
experiment suggests that the simple 2-option model (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007) does not apply 
to P. dominulus. Indeed, this finding is corroborated by evidence that Polistes foundresses and 
workers do take into account future reproductive options, and are not simply making decisions 
concerned with increasing current reproductive opportunities by investing in within-group 
cooperation and conflict. Firstly, individuals vary their investments in helping and aggression 
based on their probability of future reproduction, as determined by rank (Cant and Field 2001; 
Cant et al. 2006). Secondly, both foundresses (Starks 1998) and workers (Reeve et al. 1998) may 
adopt alternative reproductive strategies that maximize the probability of reproducing elsewhere; 
for workers, this is associated with conserving energy and going into early diapause (Tibbetts 
2007). In contrast, in the lab experiment presented here, there were no changes in aggression or 
foraging when colonies were exposed to competing nests. Three alternative explanations for this 
result are as follows. Firstly, the presence of a single competing colony may not be enough to 
cause changes; however, this is unlikely, because there were other differences between treatment 
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and control colonies (see “Stimulation of foraging and the role of aggression” below). Secondly, 
although foraging is costly in the field (O’Donnell and Jeanne 1992) and thus a good measure of 
cooperation, this is not the case in the lab, where food was readily available close to each nest. 
Thirdly, wasps in the lab may have assessed their options for future reproduction differently than 
those in the field, for example because there were no suitable hibernacula for winter diapause in 
the lab enclosures, or because queens were still present on the lab nests but removed from the 
field nests. 
 
The field results not only fail to support the 2-option model’s predictions (Reeve and Hölldobler 
2007), but also do not support those from either of the 3-option models presented here. One 
explanation could be that food was distributed unevenly in our field population, such that the 
nests we transplanted to be closer together were in an area with more food, causing more 
foraging and more activity. If this were the case, it would not be surprising that the data do not 
support the 3-option models’ predictions, given that these predictions are sensitive to v, the value 
of the resource shared among groups. An alternative explanation is that the increase in nest 
departures when nests were closer together may not have corresponded to an increase in 
foraging, but rather may have indicated an increase in wasps investigating nearby colonies for 
possible usurpations. A third explanation is that the aggression we observed does not function to 
increase the size of wasps’ current share of resources. One possible function of aggression is to 
deter non-nestmate intruders. When nests are closer together, they may be at greater risk of 
usurpation or conspecific nest intrusion to steal larvae (Reeve 1991); this costly scenario may 
select for a shift in the threshold of aggression towards nestmates (Reeve 1989; Starks et al. 
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1998). An alternative function of aggression may be to regulate foraging or activity on the nest, 
as suggested by the wasps’ behavior in the lab. 
 
Stimulation of foraging and the role of aggression 
 
There was a positive partial correlation between the change in activity and the change in 
foraging, controlling for the change in aggression, in both treatments and controls in the lab, 
which suggests that regardless of intergroup competition, higher activity is associated with 
higher foraging, as in P. fuscatus (Reeve and Gamboa 1987). However, there were differences 
between treatments and controls in other partial correlations between activity, foraging and 
aggression, which suggests that the experimental manipulation in the lab did indeed have an 
effect (see “Theoretical predictions and empirical results” above). In controls, aggression and 
foraging changed in the same direction, controlling for the change in activity, while this was not 
the case for treatments. Aggression and activity, controlling for the change in foraging, changed 
in parallel in treatments but in opposite directions in controls. This suggests a different role for 
aggression in treatments than in controls. 
 
The basis of the 2-option nested tug-of-war model (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007) is that 
intergroup competition changes the benefits to an individual of cooperatively contributing to 
group resources, as when P. dominulus workers forage for food to be shared with adult and larval 
nestmates. The positive correlation between aggression and foraging in control nests in the lab 
suggests that in the absence of intergroup competition, aggression may be involved in 
stimulating foraging: all else equal, group members face a “volunteer’s dilemma” where they 
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may do better by being lazy and letting others do the work (Field and Cant 2006; Tibbetts 2007). 
In contrast, when there are other groups competing over a shared resource, individuals may 
benefit by voluntarily going foraging. In treatment nests, i.e. those exposed to a competing nest, 
aggression may instead be directed towards increasing nest activity, as is known to be the case in 
P. fuscatus (Sumana and Starks 2004), and similar to naked mole-rats shoving lazy workers 
(Reeve 1992). Activity regulation may be carried out by the queen, as in P. fuscatus (Reeve and 
Gamboa 1987), or by workers, as in P. versicolor (De Souza and Prezoto 2012), P. instabilis and 
P. dominulus (Jha et al. 2006). Thus, aggression may not be a good measure of within-group 
competition over resource shares in P. dominulus. Likewise, in both Ropalidia marginata 
(Bruyndonckx et al. 2006; Lamba et al. 2008) and Polybia occidentalis (O’Donnell 2001; 
O’Donnell 2006), aggression is used to stimulate foraging without being involved in within-
group reproductive conflict. This may explain why the empirical results do not fully support any 
of the models’ alternative predictions about the changes in within-group competition. 
 
Implications and extensions 
 
Although many studies of different taxa support the prediction that intergroup competition is 
associated with within-group cooperation (Bornstein et al. 1990; Manson and Wrangham 1991; 
Brockhurst et al. 2007; Fisher and Hoekstra 2010; Radford 2011), there is also evidence from 
non-human primates that it can be associated with within-group aggression. For example, there 
was no relationship between within-group affiliative grooming behavior and between-group 
conflict in vervets Cercopithecus aethiops (Cheney 1992), and within-group aggression is 
associated with between-group aggression in two species of macaque (Macaca radiata: Cooper 
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et al. 2004; M. silenus: Zinner et al. 2001). Polizzi di Sorrentino et al. (2011) tested two 
hypotheses for captive capuchin (Cebus apella) groups’ responses to between-group 
competition: increased cooperation and increased “induced tension”. Their finding of increased 
within-group aggression and no change in within-group affiliative behavior supports the latter 
hypothesis and not the former; the authors suggest that within-group aggression may be a type of 
policing to maintain within-group dominance hierarchies following intergroup conflict (Polizzi 
di Sorrentino et al. 2011). 
 
Many social taxa have easily quantifiable cooperative behaviors, such as grooming in primates 
(Newton-Fisher and Lee 2011) and foraging in social insects (Cant and Field 2001), but 
identifying behavior that contributes to within-group resource competition may not be so easy. 
Thus, future studies should determine how to assess both within-group conflict and the extent to 
which individuals are conserving resources for future reproduction. In addition, future theoretical 
and empirical work should investigate the effect of asymmetries in group size. The result here 
that when a focal nest was larger relative to its competing nest, there was a non-significantly 
larger change in the proportion of wasps off the focal nest, suggests that group size may have an 
effect on cooperation and intergroup competition, as it does in capuchins Cebus capucinus 
(Crofoot and Gilby 2011) and marmosets Callithrix kuhli (Schaffner and French 1997). Further 
theoretical work should also explore other methods of modeling the 3-option scenario, beyond 
the tradeoff between current and future reproduction presented here. One potential approach is, 
rather than constraining each option to benefit either the individual or the group, as in the current 
models, to weight each option according to the extent to which it benefits the individual and the 
group, and investigate how these weightings affect individuals’ optimal investments in each.  
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In sum, the implications of this study are as follows. Firstly, there was not a direct tradeoff 
between foraging and aggression. This may be because individuals face an additional tradeoff 
between investing in current versus future reproduction; this is beyond the scope of the present 
study’s results, but regardless points to the importance of not assuming that all energy not 
invested in conflict is invested in cooperation (Queller and Strassmann 2009). Secondly, we must 
be cautious about interpreting aggressive behavior: it may be implicated in reproductive conflict, 
but this is not necessarily the case. Thirdly, the effect of intergroup competition may be more 
subtle than a simple increase in within-group cooperation or conflict, as demonstrated by the 
correlations in the lab results presented here. For example, people respond to the presence of 
competing groups even when this does not affect their incentives for cooperation (Tan and Bolle 
2007), analogous to social facilitation (Zajonc 1965) at a group level. Future work should 
investigate why different groups respond in different ways. Finally, if intergroup competition 
does affect within-group behavior, this raises the intriguing possibility that group members could 
manipulate such an effect to their own advantage, for example in order to stimulate cooperation 
(Barclay and Benard 2011). 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Post-transplant nearest neighbor distances were within the range we observed for pre-transplant 
nests (Figure S3.1).
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
Figure S3.1. Nearest neighbor distances of nests at the field site (a) before and (b) after the 
experimental transplant.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ASYMMETRIES IN A SOCIAL GROUP: 
DIVISION OF LABOR AND INTERGROUP COMPETITION 
 
Jessica L. Barker, Kevin J. Loope and H. Kern Reeve 
 
A major challenge in behavioral ecology is to explain cooperation among individuals in social 
groups. Competition among groups provides one explanation for within-group cooperative 
behavior, but existing models of intergroup competition have failed to account for the fact that 
not all group members invest in cooperation. Social groups are often characterized by 
competitive and relatedness asymmetries among group members, and here we present a game 
theoretic model of cooperation that incorporates both within-group variation and between-group 
competition. In the model, each group contains two roles; a player’s strategy dictates its behavior 
in each role, and individuals in each role make simultaneous, coevolving decisions. When 
relatedness, relative competitive efficiency and the number of individuals are allowed to vary 
between roles, the model predicts that individuals in one role (“workers”) predominantly 
contribute to group resources, while an individual in the other role (the “queen”) generally gains 
the larger share of these resources. This effect is greatest when there is a greater asymmetry in 
competitive efficiency between the roles, when individuals in the worker-like role are more 
related to each other than they are to the individual in the queen-like role, and when there are 
more workers in the group. The model also predicts that the effect of intergroup competition on 
both roles’ cooperation is only noticeable when there are few competing groups. These 
predictions are consistent with observations in many social groups (e.g. hymenopteran societies 
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with a single queen, many workers, and caste dimorphism), but need to be explicitly tested. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The balance between cooperation and conflict within social groups, and concomitantly the 
degree of equitable resource division, is a major area of research in behavioral ecology (Owens 
2006; West et al. 2007; Korb and Heinze 2008; Clutton-Brock et al. 2009; Cant 2012). In 
particular, much research has focused on explaining the origin and maintenance of eusociality in 
insects (Wilson 1971; Reeve 2001; Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2007; Gadagkar 2009; Ratnieks and 
Helanterä 2009): many insect societies exhibit such high levels of cooperation and low levels of 
conflict that they function as “superorganisms” (Wilson and Sober 1989; Reeve and Hölldobler 
2007; Hölldobler and Wilson 2009) whose evolution is analogous to that of a multicellular 
organism (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Michod and Roze 2001; Queller and Strassmann 
2009). Insect societies vary in social complexity (Bourke 1999) and form a continuum of 
sociality with other taxa (Sherman et al. 1995). However, individuals across the sociality 
continuum face a common tradeoff: how much to invest in obtaining a larger share of the group’s 
resources for personal reproduction, at the expense of investing in cooperative production of 
more resources that are shared among all group members (Reeve et al. 1998). 
 
One hypothesis to explain this balance between cooperation and conflict within groups concerns 
the effect of conflict between groups; that is, when intergroup competition is higher, a group 
member benefits by investing more in within-group cooperation (Rabbie and Wilkens 1971; 
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Bornstein et al. 1990; Bornstein 2003; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). This is because within-group 
cooperation allows a group to compete more effectively against other groups: intergroup 
competition increases the net benefit to an individual of within-group cooperation (Reeve and 
Hölldobler 2007). Thus, this hypothesis (1) is consistent with individual selection, since 
multilevel trait-group selection models are equivalent to individual selection models (Dugatkin 
and Reeve 1994; West et al. 2011); and (2) does not preclude the role of relatedness, but rather 
shows how within-group cooperation can be favored even when within-group relatedness is low 
(Korb and Heinze 2004; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). There is wide support for the intergroup 
competition hypothesis, primarily from vertebrates including humans (Sherif et al. 1954; 
Bornstein and Ben-Yossef 1994; Bornstein et al. 2002; Bowles 2009; Puurtinen and Mappes 
2009; Gneezy and Fessler 2012), other primates (chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes: Wilson and 
Wrangham 2003; Muller and Mitani 2005), and birds (green woodhoopoes, Phoeniculus 
purpureus: Radford 2008; Radford 2011), in addition to intraorganismal intergroup conflict 
among mouse sperm (Peromyscus spp.: Fisher and Hoekstra 2010). Intergroup competition has 
also been proposed as a factor selecting for superorganism-like insect societies (Reeve and 
Hölldobler 2007), although there are few tests of this hypothesis in social invertebrates (but see 
Rissing et al. 1989; Korb and Foster 2010). 
 
While the intergroup competition hypothesis undoubtedly explains many instances of within-
group cooperation, it does not take into account differences among group members. Firstly, there 
may be consistent individual variation in cooperative behavior (Bergmüller et al. 2010; 
McNamara and Leimar 2010), as in meerkats, Suricata suricatta (English et al. 2010); and lions, 
Panthera leo (Heinsohn and Packer 1995). Secondly, group members may vary their cooperation 
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depending on their relatedness to the recipients, for example in paper wasps, Polistes dominulus 
(Queller et al. 2000; but see Leadbeater et al. 2010); slime molds, Dictyostelium discoideum 
(Strassmann et al. 2000); and bee-eaters, Merops bullockoides (Emlen and Wrege 1988). Thirdly, 
the costs and benefits of cooperation may differ for different group members: reasons for such 
differences include variation in individuals’ “power” to respond to  conflicts of interest 
(Beekman et al. 2003; Beekman and Ratnieks 2003) and in the probability of obtaining a 
breeding opportunity (Cant and Field 2001; Cant and Field 2005; Field et al. 2006). Insect 
societies in particular exhibit striking within-group division of cooperative labor (Reeve and 
Keller 2001; Field and Cant 2006), for example between queens and workers. 
 
In order to understand fully the effect of intergroup competition on within-group cooperation, it 
is therefore crucial to incorporate within-group variation. Here, we present a game theoretic 
model in which group members adopt one of two roles, where individuals in one role may differ 
in relatedness and relative competitive efficiency (“power”, sensu Beekman et al. 2003; 
Beekman and Ratnieks 2003) to other group members. Individuals in each role make decisions 
simultaneously: that is, their behaviors coevolve. We use Reeve and Hölldobler’s (2007) game 
theoretic nested tug-of-war framework, and examine how within-group asymmetries interact 
with intergroup competition to affect within-group cooperation and resource division. 
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MODEL 
 
Structure of the model 
 
Each member of a social group adopts one of two roles, with n1 individuals in Role 1 and n2 
individuals in Role 2. A group member plays the optimal strategy x* of selfishly investing effort 
in acquiring a share of the group’s resources, which translate into reproductive opportunities (we 
use “share of reproduction” and “within-group share of resources” interchangeably), at the 
expense of cooperatively contributing 1-x* to the total amount of resources shared by all group 
members (that is, the “group’s productivity”, or the “group’s share”; we use these terms 
interchangeably). An individual playing this strategy plays x1* when in Role 1 and x2* in Role 2. 
Likewise, an individual adopting the mutant strategy x plays x1 in Role 1 and x2 in Role 2. A 
strategy is therefore a rule telling an individual which pair of role-specific sub-strategies to 
adopt, i.e. x1* or x2* versus x1 or x2.  
 
Here we take a neighbor-modulated fitness approach to modeling relatedness within groups 
(Hamilton 1964; Wenseleers et al. 2010). We consider the invasion of a rare mutant allele x in a 
population of individuals playing x*. If the mutant allele causing an individual to play x instead 
of x* is in an individual in Role 1, this allele will be found in another Role 1 player with 
probability r11, and in a Role 2 individual with probability r12. Likewise, if this mutant allele is in 
a focal Role 2 player, it will be found in another individual in Role 2 with probability r22, and in 
a Role 1 player with probability r21. 
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In order to find the evolutionarily stable values of x1*and x2*, we consider a focal mutant 
individual’s expected fitness w across the two roles: w1 and w2 for Role 1 and Role 2 
respectively. We use Reeve and Hölldobler’s (2007) nested tug-of-war approach, where an 
individual’s fitness, w, is given by the amount of resource it obtains. In a population of ng groups 
competing over a resource of value v, an individual’s fitness is determined by the fraction p of 
resource obtained by this individual’s group (i.e. the group’s productivity) and the fraction q of 
the group productivity obtained by the individual itself: 
 
Equation 4.1 
         
         
 
The resource itself can take any form, such as food or breeding opportunities, that can be 
converted into reproductive units. The within-group fraction q is determined by the ratio of the 
focal individual’s selfish effort to others’ in the group (Reeve et al. 1998), given that there is 
scramble competition over the resource the group has obtained (Cant 2012). The return on a 
given investment in selfish conflict varies between roles, where individuals in Role 2 may have a 
reduced competitive efficiency b relative to those in Role 1 (0<b≤1). For example, if b=0.5, a 
given investment in competition by a Role 2 player is half as effective in determining the 
outcome of that competition relative to the same investment by a Role 1 player. This is 
analogous to individuals’ power in the group (Beekman et al. 2003; Beekman and Ratnieks 
2003). 
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An individual’s neighbor-modulated fitness is determined by the effects on its direct fitness 
generated by the actions of others. In this model, therefore, it is a function of all group members’ 
selfish investments, and we must consider (1) the focal individual’s own selfish efforts, (2) those 
of others in the same role who do and do not share the same allele, and (3) those of others in the 
other role who do and do not share the same allele. We thus construct expressions for q1 and q2 
as follows: 
 
Equation 4.2 
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In other words, the fraction of the group productivity that a focal individual receives, i.e. its share 
of reproduction relative to others in its group, is determined by the ratio of its selfish effort to the 
sum of the selfish efforts of all individuals in its group.  For individuals in Role 2, selfish effort 
x2 is modulated by the competitive efficiency factor b.     
 
The fraction of the total resource that a group obtains, i.e. its productivity p, depends on its 
members’ investment in cooperation, for example foraging effort by workers. The combined 
effort of all group members may be greater by a factor k than the sum of individual efforts, and 
thus the total cooperative investments, c, by groups with a focal mutant in Role 1, focal mutant in 
Role 2, and no mutant individuals are respectively:  
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Equation 4.3 
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Given that groups are engaged in competition over productivity (“production competition”, sensu 
Cant 2012), the fraction p of the total resource that each group obtains is the ratio of its total 
cooperative effort to the efforts of ng-1 other groups (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). We assume 
that the intensity of within-group competition is the same as the intensity of between-group 
competition (see appendix) and that there is a zero probability of individuals in another group 
possessing by common descent the mutant allele present in individuals in the focal group. The 
fractions of resource obtained by groups with a focal mutant in Role 1 and in Role 2 respectively 
are therefore: 
 
Equation 4.4 
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We then substitute the expressions for q1, q2, p1 and p2 into w1 and w2. The probability that an 
individual is in each role is given by the proportion of group members in that role. An 
individual’s expected fitness w across both roles is therefore: 
 
Equation 4.5 
  
  
     
   
  
     
   
 
Analyzing the model 
 
In order to obtain the ESS pair x1* and x2* that maximizes an individual’s fitness, we find the 
partial derivatives 
  
   
 and 
  
   
. At equilibrium, the partial derivatives are equal to zero, x1 is equal 
to x1*, and x2 is equal to x2*. We simultaneously solve this pair of equations for the 
evolutionarily stable pair of solutions x1* and x2*, and verify that these values are fitness maxima 
by checking that 
   
    
 and 
   
    
 are negative. We also identified stable boundary solutions (x*=0 
or 1): we set one of x1* and x2* equal to one of the boundary values and solved for the stable 
solution in the other variable, by setting the partial derivative of fitness with respect to the non-
boundary variable to zero. We then checked for stability by determining whether the first 
derivative of the boundary solution was negative (if x=0) or positive (if x=1) while the second 
derivative with respect to the other variable was negative at the solution. 
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We used Mathematica 8.0 (Wolfram Research) to analyze the model, and were unable to obtain 
analytical solutions. For simplicity, unless otherwise stated, we restrict the numerical results 
below to those appropriate to monogynous hymenopteran societies, which are the focus of this 
model. We consider a single individual in Role 1 (n1=1), with r12=r21=0.5: that is, individuals in 
Role 2 are worker daughters of the single queen in Role 1. Additionally, r22 = 
 
 
  
  
, where m is 
the queen’s mating frequency, and thus 0.25≤r22≤0.75 (in the appendix, we present results for 
0≤r22≤1). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Overview 
 
When b=1 and r12=r21=r22 (or r12=r21 and n2=1), the game is symmetrical, and yields the same 
numerical results as Reeve and Hölldobler’s (2007) symmetrical analytical model. When the 
game is asymmetrical, an individual in Role 2 generally contributes more to group productivity 
(i.e., invests more in cooperation) but receives a smaller fraction of the benefits of this 
productivity (i.e., a smaller share of reproduction) than does an individual in Role 1, except when 
relatedness between members of Role 1 (r22) is low. 
 
Number of competing groups (ng) 
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Individuals in both Role 1 and Role 2 increase their cooperative efforts (1-x1* and 1-x2* 
respectively) as the number of competing groups (ng) increases, but for low ng only (Figure 4.1a-
b). Similarly, the Role 1 player receives a larger share of reproduction (q1) for increasing but 
small ng, while a Role 2 player’s share (q2) is insensitive to the number of competing groups 
(Figure 4.1c-d). Given that the number of competing groups has an increasingly small effect on 
individuals’ cooperative efforts and reproductive shares, for a range of values of n2, b and r22 
(Figure 4.1), in the following results we fix ng=10. 
 
Number of individuals in Role 2 (n2) 
 
When there are many individuals in Role 2 (high n2), they are highly related to each other and 
competitively inefficient relative to the Role 1 individual (b<1), the Role 1 player invests zero in 
cooperative group productivity, and each Role 2 player invests almost everything. In contrast, 
when Role 2 players are not highly related (low r22), the Role 1 player invests much and each 
Role 2 player invests little in cooperation when n2 is high: thus, the effect of changing n2 is 
highly sensitive to r22 (Figure 4.2a-b). Additionally, the effect of increasing n2 is greatest when n2 
is already low (i.e. decelerating effect), and when b is low (Figure 4.3a-b). 
 
Both the Role 1 and Role 2 players receive a smaller fraction of resources when there are more 
individuals in Role 2 (Figures 4.2c-d, 4.3c-d), particularly when b is higher. 
 
Relatedness asymmetry (r22) 
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When the Role 1 and Role 2 individuals are symmetrically related to each other (i.e., the 
probability of an allele being carried by an individual in one role, given that it is carried by an 
individual in the other role, is the same, regardless of the role) by r12=r21=0.5 (e.g. mother and 
daughters), higher relatedness among Role 2 individuals (r22) results in higher cooperation by 
each individual in Role 2, but lower cooperation by the Role 1 player (Figures 4.2a-b, 4.4a-b). 
This effect is particularly strong when there are more individuals in Role 1 (high n2) and they are 
more competitively equal to the individual in Role 1 (high b): indeed, in the latter case, the Role 
1 player invests zero in cooperation. However, when relatedness among Role 2 individuals is low 
and either n2 or b is high, the Role 1 player invests a lot and the Role 2 player invests very little 
in cooperation. 
 
In contrast, the fraction of group resources obtained by each party is relatively insensitive to r22 
(Figures 4.2c-d, 4.4c-d). 
 
Competitive asymmetry (b) 
 
When individuals in each role are more evenly competitively matched (b approaches 1), the Role 
1 player invests more in cooperation, and each Role 2 player invests less (Figures 4.3a-b, 4.4a-b). 
The effect of b is greatest when Role 2 players are not highly related to each other (r22 is lower) 
and there are more Role 2 players in the group (n2 is higher). 
 
As b increases, the Role 1 player obtains a smaller share of reproduction and each Role 2 player 
obtains a larger share (Figures 4.3c-d, 4.4c-d). The Role 1 player’s share is more sensitive to b 
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than is a Role 2 player’s, and is most sensitive to b when there are more individuals in Role 2 
and they are less related to each other.
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The effect of the number of competing groups, ng, on: (a) the Role 1 player’s 
contribution to group productivity, and (b) a Role 2 player’s contribution to group productivity. 
Each group has a single individual in Role 1 (n1=1), who is related to individuals in Role 2 by 
0.5, and vice versa (r12=r21=0.5). Solid lines: n2=10, b=1, r22=0.5; dot-dashed lines: n2=1, b=1, 
r22=0.5; dotted lines: n2=10, b=0.1, r22= 0.5; dashed lines: n2=10, b=1, r22=0.75. 
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(c) 
 
 
(d) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 continued. The effect of the number of competing groups, ng, on: (c) the Role 1 
player’s share of reproduction, and (d) a Role 2 player’s share of reproduction. Each group has a 
single individual in Role 1 (n1=1), who is related to individuals in Role 2 by 0.5, and vice versa 
(r12=r21=0.5). Solid lines: n2=10, b=1, r22=0.5; dot-dashed lines: n2=1, b=1, r22=0.5; dotted lines: 
n2=10, b=0.1, r22= 0.5; dashed lines: n2=10, b=1, r22=0.75. 
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(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The effect of the number of individuals in Role 2, n2, and their relatedness to each 
other, r22, on: (a) the Role 1 player’s contribution to group productivity, and (b) a Role 2 player’s 
contribution to group productivity. Ten groups are competing over the resource (ng=10). Each 
group has a single Role 1 player (n1=1); individuals in one role are symmetrically related to those 
in the other role by 0.5 (r12=r21=0.5), and there is no asymmetry in competitive efficiency (b=1). 
The black bar shows how, in Hymenoptera, the Role 1 player’s (i.e., the queen’s) mating 
frequency, m, corresponds to relatedness among Role 2 players (i.e., the workers), r22. 
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(c) 
 
 
 
(d) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. The effect of the number of individuals in Role 2, n2, and their relatedness to each 
other, r22, on: (c) the Role 1 player’s share of reproduction, and (d) a Role 2 player’s share of 
reproduction. Ten groups are competing over the resource (ng=10). Each group has a single Role 
1 player (n1=1); individuals in one role are symmetrically related to those in the other role by 0.5 
(r12=r21=0.5), and there is no asymmetry in competitive efficiency (b=1). The black bar shows 
how, in Hymenoptera, the Role 1 player’s (i.e., the queen’s) mating frequency, m, corresponds to 
relatedness among Role 2 players (i.e., the workers), r22.   
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(a)  
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. The effect of the number of individuals in Role 2, n2, and their competitive efficiency 
relative to individuals in Role 1, b, on: (a) the Role 1 player’s contribution to group productivity, 
and(b) a Role 2 player’s contribution to group productivity. Ten groups are competing over the 
resource (ng=10). Each group has a single individual in Role 1 (n1=1); all group members are 
related to each other by 0.5 (r12=r21=r22=0.5); that is, relatedness is symmetrical, and the only 
asymmetries are in n2 and b. 
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(c) 
 
 
(d) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. The effect of the number of individuals in Role 2, n2, and their competitive efficiency 
relative to individuals in Role 1, b, on: (c) the Role 1 player’s share of reproduction, and (d) a 
Role 2 player’s share of reproduction. Ten groups are competing over the resource (ng=10). Each 
group has a single individual in Role 1 (n1=1); all group members are related to each other by 0.5 
(r12=r21=r22=0.5); that is, relatedness is symmetrical, and the only asymmetries are in n2 and b. 
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(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. The effect of Role 2 players’ competitive efficiency, b, and their relatedness to each 
other, r22, on: (a) the Role 1 player’s contribution to group productivity, and (b) a Role 2 player’s 
contribution to group productivity. Ten groups are competing over the resource (ng=10); each 
group consists of a single individual in Role 1 (n1=1) and ten in Role 2 (n2=10). Individuals in 
one role are symmetrically related to those in the other role by 0.5 (r12=r21=0.5).The black bar 
shows how, in Hymenoptera, the Role 1 player’s (i.e., the queen’s) mating frequency, m, 
corresponds to relatedness among Role 2 players (i.e., the workers), r22.  
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(c) 
 
 
 
(d) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. The effect of Role 2 players’ competitive efficiency, b, and their relatedness to each 
other, r22, on: (c) the Role 1 player’s share of reproduction, and (d) a Role 2 player’s share of 
reproduction. Ten groups are competing over the resource (ng=10); each group consists of a 
single individual in Role 1 (n1=1) and ten in Role 2 (n2=10). Individuals in one role are 
symmetrically related to those in the other role by 0.5 (r12=r21=0.5).The black bar shows how, in 
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Hymenoptera, the Role 1 player’s (i.e., the queen’s) mating frequency, m, corresponds to 
relatedness among Role 2 players (i.e., the workers), r22.
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DISCUSSION 
 
We found that when an individual’s behavior is allowed to differ depending on the role it adopts 
within a group (i.e. potential within-group asymmetry), intergroup competition results in 
increased within-group cooperation, as for symmetrical groups with a single behavioral role 
(Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). Two important points emerge from the asymmetric model 
presented here. Firstly, not all individuals cooperate: for the range of parameters used here, the 
individual in Role 1 generally invests less in cooperation than does an individual in Role 2, and 
sometimes does not cooperate at all. As in the symmetrical model, few competing groups in the 
population need be present in order to favor within-group cooperation, and the presence of 
additional groups does not affect the level of cooperation. Secondly, not all individuals reap the 
benefits of this cooperation: in most cases, the Role 1 player gains a larger share of the group’s 
productivity than does a Role 2 player, and the number of competing groups has little effect on 
this. Given that there is wide variation in the distribution among group members of cooperation 
(for example, based on dominance: Cant and Field 2005) and reproduction (skew: Sherman et al. 
1995; Lacey and Sherman 2005), this model provides a more accurate picture of real social 
groups than does a symmetric game.  
 
As this study was motivated by expanding the intergroup competition model to hymenopteran 
groups (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007), we used numerical parameter values appropriate for 
haplodiploid mother-daughter societies, with the mother in Role 1 and daughters in Role 2. Thus, 
the Role 1 player may be considered the queen, and the Role 2 players the workers (these terms 
used interchangeably hereafter).  Unlike many other models of social evolution, here we do not 
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assume that workers are coerced by policing (Frank 2003; Wenseleers et al. 2004) or that they 
are somatic extensions of the queen (Nowak et al. 2010); that is, in this model, workers are free 
to make their decision in the context of asymmetry in relatedness, worker number, and 
competitive efficiency, and this decision coevolves with the queen’s. Furthermore, note that 
although the optimal behavior of a Role 1 player is typically associated with within-group 
dominance, and that of a Role 2 player with subordinance, these roles are not intrinsically 
“dominant” and “subordinate”, especially if individuals in each role have the same competitive 
efficiency (b=1). The predictions emerged simply by assigning realistic values to the relatedness 
and group size parameters; these values may easily be substituted for others in order to make the 
model more general (see appendix). Below, we discuss the effects of changing the values of the 
parameters in the model. 
 
Effects of within-group asymmetries on cooperation and skew 
 
When there are more individuals in Role 2 (higher n2), both the workers (Role 2) and the queen 
(Role 1) invest less in cooperation, as predicted by the symmetrical model (Reeve and 
Hölldobler 2007), and obtain smaller shares of the resource. This is because individuals can 
parasitize others’ cooperative investments in group productivity, which are then divided among 
more individuals. Although it is already known that per capita group productivity decreases as 
group size increases (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007 and references therein), the novel prediction 
here is that both a queen and workers’ investments in productivity decrease as the number of 
workers increases. A simple test of this prediction would be an intraspecific comparison of 
queens’ contributions to group productivity in differently sized colonies of a primitively eusocial 
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taxon, such as Polistes wasps, noting that queens may contribute to group productivity in 
different ways than do workers (O’Donnell 1998). 
 
In hymenopteran societies with a single queen, the probabilities that an allele in a given 
individual is also found in another individual, due to common descent, are  r12=r21=0.5 between 
the queen and a worker, and vice versa. Between two workers, r22 = 
 
 
  
  
, where m is the queen’s 
mating frequency and 0.25<r22<0.75. Using these numerical values, the model predicts that the 
queen (Role 1) cooperates less and workers (Role 2) cooperate more when the queen has a lower 
mating frequency and thus worker-worker relatedness is higher (Boomsma 2007; Boomsma 
2009). As in the symmetrical model, when r22 decreases, workers benefit less from investing in 
within-group competition, particularly when there are more workers (high n2): this means that 
the group obtains less resource, and thus the queen, whose relatedness to the workers is fixed, 
benefits by investing more in cooperative group productivity. One would therefore predict more 
potential conflict among workers in colonies with a multiply mated queen. Note, however, that 
multiple mating selects for worker policing (Ratnieks 1988), but that the model here allows 
individuals to make optimal decisions in the absence of any coercion or policing. Thus, conflict 
reduction mechanisms are likely to prevent the high potential conflict predicted at low worker 
relatedness from becoming actual conflict (Ratnieks and Reeve 1992). 
 
A further parameter of asymmetry absent from the symmetric game is b, the competitive 
efficiency of an individual in Role 2 relative to an individual in Role 1. In many societies, 
individuals differ in their “power” to affect the outcome of a conflict (Beekman et al. 2003), and 
thus it is important to take this parameter into account. Here, we combine the framework of a 
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single-group, asymmetric 2-player tug-of-war skew model (Reeve et al. 1998) with the 
intergroup, symmetric n-player nested tug-of-war model (Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). Thus, we 
generate the prediction that when b is lower, an individual in Role 1 (queen) cooperates less but 
an individual in Role 2 (worker) cooperates more. In this case, workers get a low return on any 
investment in within-group competition, which (1) favors greater investment in cooperation, and 
(2) results in each worker obtaining a smaller share of the group’s resource (i.e. reproductive 
opportunities), as in the 2-player model (Reeve et al. 1998). 
 
Although this prediction is testable, attempts to quantify individuals’ relative competitive 
abilities in insect societies have had mixed success. For example, there is conflicting evidence in 
Polistes wasps for predictors of success in agonistic interactions, with body size, age, facial 
markings and order of arrival at the nest among the factors implicated in dominance (Hughes and 
Strassmann 1988; Seppä et al. 2002; Tibbetts and Dale 2004; Cervo et al. 2008; Zanette and 
Field 2009; Green and Field 2011). However, we might expect workers who are morphologically 
more distinct from the queen to have a lower relative competitive efficiency, since their 
specialization may make them less able to participate in competition over shares of group 
productivity (Bourke 1999). According to the maternal manipulation hypothesis (Alexander 
1974), larval feeding can affect queen-worker morphological divergence (Wheeler 1986), for 
example in sweat bees, Megalopta genalis (Kapheim et al. 2011); this could potentially be a 
mechanism to reduce worker competitive efficiency (Beekman and Ratnieks 2003). Such a 
mechanism may be more likely to be favored when there are more workers, given that workers in 
larger colonies invest less in cooperation. Indeed, there is more elaborate worker specialization 
and complex division of labor in larger colonies (Bourke 1999).  
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Extending the model 
 
In order to focus our numerical analyses, we did not analyze all possible parameter values in the 
model. Two assumptions in particular, that there is only one individual in Role 1 (queen) and that 
individuals in a given group are unrelated to members of other groups, could be relaxed and 
explored using the same model framework. 
 
The assumption that each group contains a single queen (n1=1) with a varying number of worker 
offspring (n2) is true for many insect societies, such as honeybees and vespine wasps (Wilson 
1971), but many other insect societies exhibit variation in queen number (Keller 1993; Bourke 
and Heinze 1994). In order to incorporate multiple queens into the model, one would set n1>1, 
and assign a value to r11 (e.g. 0.75, if queens are full sisters). The latter value determines the 
other relatednesses: for example, if all queens produce worker offspring, r12 would be a queen’s 
average relatedness to any given worker. Intuitively, one might predict individuals in Role 1 
(queens) to invest less in cooperation when n1 increases and when r11 decreases; indeed, many of 
the most complex cooperative societies (that is, those with highly specialized worker castes, for 
example in honeybee, army ant, and leafcutter ant colonies) have single queens (Bourke 1999). 
 
When constructing the model, we assumed complete dispersal of new reproductives, such that 
group members are unrelated to individuals in other groups. This allowed us to focus on the 
effects of within-group asymmetries in the most basic scenario of competition with unrelated 
groups. However, there is evidence for female philopatry in some hymenopteran societies 
(Johnstone et al. 2012): thus, if a focal individual carries an allele for the mutant strategy x, there 
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is a non-zero probability that individuals in other groups also carry the allele for x. This 
probability would depend on how closely the queens are related to each other (e.g. queens in 
neighboring groups are full or half-sisters), and, in constructing the model, would be 
incorporated into the expression for p, the ratio of groups’ cooperative efforts. One might expect 
both a queen’s (Role 1) and worker’s (Role 2) within-group cooperation to decrease, all else 
being equal, if they are more related to individuals in competing groups, as in a symmetrical 
game (West et al. 2002; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). 
 
Summary 
 
The tug-of-war model presented here generates several testable predictions about the degree of 
within-group cooperation in asymmetrical groups. This model provides a more realistic view of 
intra-group behavior than (a) a symmetrical model, since group members are undoubtedly not all 
the same, and (b) a single-group model, since groups rarely exist in isolation, but instead are 
embedded in a population of other groups. By incorporating within-group asymmetries, this 
model is able to make predictions, for example about the equitability of within-group resource 
sharing, that a symmetrical model is unable to make. The model’s predictions can be applied not 
just to hymenopteran insects, but to any other social organisms, from bacteria (Griffin et al. 
2004; Brockhurst et al. 2007) and slime molds (Strassmann et al. 2000) to cooperatively breeding 
vertebrates (Solomon and French 1997; Koenig and Dickinson 2004; Hager and Jones 2009). 
This paves the way for empirical tests in diverse taxa, ultimately shedding light on unifying 
evolutionary principles governing the balance between cooperation and competition.  
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Intensity of competition 
 
When the intensity of within-group competition, y, is equal to 1, an individual that invests t times 
as much in selfishness relative to others’ investments receives a fraction t times greater of the 
resource. However, when the intensity of within-group competition is low (y<1), additional 
investment in selfishness results in a smaller increase in the fraction of resource; in contrast, a 
very high y (>1) describes an intense winner-takes-all competition. Incorporating y, the within-
group shares of a focal mutant individual in Role 1 and Role 2 respectively are: 
 
Equation S4.1 
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 )     (       (     )   
 )⁄  
   
   
 
   
  (    ) (       (     )   
 )    (       (     )   
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Similarly, the exponent z describes the intensity of between-group competition, i.e. the extent to 
which a group’s additional investment in c increases the fraction of resource p that it obtains. 
These fractions acquired by groups with a focal mutant individual in Role 1 and Role 2 
respectively are: 
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Equation S4.2 
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We substitute these expressions for q1, q2, p1 and p2 into the fitness function w and obtain 
numerical solutions, as before. 
 
When the intensity of between-group competition z increases relative to the intensity of within-
group competition y, both parties increase their investments in cooperation (results not shown). 
This corroborates others’ findings that cooperation decreases with local competition and 
increases with global competition (West et al. 2006; Reeve and Hölldobler 2007). 
 
 
2. Full range of subordinate relatedness values 
 
Below we present numerical results for the entire range of Role 2 – Role 2 relatedness values 
(0≤r22≤1). As before, each group has a single individual in Role 1 (n1=1); individuals in Role 1 
and Role 2 are symmetrically related to each other by 0.5 (r12=r21=0.5).  
 
When r22 is low, a Role 2 player invests less in cooperation than does the Role 1 player (Figures 
S4.1a-b, S4.2a-b). The magnitude of r22 changes the effect on within-group cooperation of 
increasing the number of Role 2 players: when r22 is high, the Role 1 player’s cooperation 
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decreases and a Role 2 player’s increases when there are more individuals playing Role 2 (high 
n2), but the opposite is true for low r22. 
 
When r22 is higher, the Role 1 player receives a larger share of reproduction, but each Role 2 
player receives a smaller share; the size of a Role 2 player’s share is less sensitive to r22 than is 
the Role 1 player’s share (Figures S4.1c-d, S4.2c-d). This contrasts with the two-player 
asymmetric tug-of-war, where skew is independent of r. One might predict from the n-player 
model presented here that skew would be lower in colonies with a multiply mated queen in Role 
1. 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
Figure S4.1. The effect of the number of individuals in Role 2, n2, and their relatedness to each 
other, r22, on: (a) the Role 1 player’s contribution to group productivity, and (b) a Role 2 player’s 
contribution to group productivity. Ten groups are competing over the resource (ng=10). Each 
group has a single individual playing Role 1 (n1=1); individuals in one role are symmetrically 
related to those in the other role by 0.5 (r12=r21=0.5), and there is no asymmetry in competitive 
efficiency (b=1). The black bar shows the range of r22 values in hymenopteran groups, where the 
queen is in Role 1 and workers are in Role 2 (as presented in main text, Figure 4.2).  
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(c) 
 
 
(d) 
 
 
Figure S4.1 continued. The effect of the number of individuals in Role 2, n2, and their 
relatedness to each other, r22, on: (c) the Role 1 player’s share of reproduction, and (d) a Role 2 
player’s share of reproduction. Ten groups are competing over the resource (ng=10). Each group 
has a single individual playing Role 1 (n1=1); individuals in one role are symmetrically related to 
those in the other role by 0.5 (r12=r21=0.5), and there is no asymmetry in competitive efficiency 
(b=1). The black bar shows the range of r22 values in hymenopteran groups, where the queen is 
in Role 1 and workers are in Role 2 (as presented in main text, Figure 4.2). 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
Figure S4.2. The effect of Role 2 players’ competitive efficiency, b, and their relatedness to each 
other, r22, on: (a) the Role 1 player’s contribution to group productivity, and (b) a Role 2 player’s 
contribution to group productivity. Ten groups are competing over the resource (ng=10); each 
group has a single individual playing Role 1 (n1=1) and ten playing Role 2 (n2=10). Individuals 
in one role are symmetrically related to those in the other role by 0.5 (r12=r21=0.5). The black bar 
shows the range of r22 values in hymenopteran groups, where the queen is in Role 1 and workers 
are in Role 2 (as presented in main text, Figure 4.4). 
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(c) 
 
 
(d) 
 
 
Figure S4.2 continued. The effect of Role 2 players’ competitive efficiency, b, and their 
relatedness to each other, r22, on: (c) the Role 1 player’s share of reproduction, and (d) a Role 2 
player’s share of reproduction. Ten groups are competing over the resource (ng=10); each group 
has a single individual playing Role 1 (n1=1) and ten playing Role 2 (n2=10). Individuals in one 
role are symmetrically related to those in the other role by 0.5 (r12=r21=0.5). The black bar shows 
the range of r22 values in hymenopteran groups, where the queen is in Role 1 and workers are in 
Role 2 (as presented in main text, Figure 4.4).
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CHAPTER 5 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT OVER FORAGING IN A PRIMITIVELY EUSOCIAL WASP: 
INVESTIGATING AGGRESSION TOWARDS EXPERIMENTALLY REMOVED 
POLISTES DOMINULUS WORKERS 
 
Jessica L. Barker and H. Kern Reeve 
 
Evolutionary conflicts of interest between members of social groups lead to potential within-
group conflict as well as cooperation. One form of potential conflict is over the effort that non-
breeders invest in working or helping to raise the breeders’ offspring. “Lazy” workers may 
impose a cost on other group members, which could select for group members to pay attention to 
how hard others are working. We experimentally removed workers in the primitively eusocial 
wasp Polistes dominulus during periods of high foraging activity, in order to determine whether 
nestmates responded to an individual worker’s apparent lack of work. We found that focal 
removed workers who had access to food while removed received more aggression when they 
returned that those without food access, but the time they spent off the nest did not affect the 
aggression they received. These results are consistent with a hypothesized function of aggression 
as a means to obtain food forcibly from a returning forager. An alternative hypothesis, that 
aggression is used to punish “lazy” workers, is less strongly supported. We predict that 
punishment of lazy workers may occur when other group members suffer a net cost as a result of 
this laziness, and that workers will be more likely to be lazy when they have a higher probability 
of gaining direct fitness benefits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Social groups across the animal kingdom are not only characterized by cooperation among group 
members, but also by conflict (Emlen 1982; Frank 2003; Queller and Strassmann 2009; Cant 
2012), even in highly cooperative eusocial insect groups (Bourke 1999; Ratnieks et al. 2006; 
Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2007; Strassmann and Queller 2007). Kin selection theory (Hamilton 
1964) predicts that potential conflict will arise whenever group members have genetic conflicts 
of interest; such potential conflict may occur in several different scenarios. Conflict over caste 
determination (Bourke and Ratnieks 1999), sex ratios (Reuter and Keller 2001; Mehdiabadi et al. 
2003) and worker male production (Hammond and Keller 2004) are specific to social 
Hymenoptera. However, other types of conflict occur in social groups of diverse taxa, such as 
competition over breeding opportunities; this may involve competing over access to mates, as in 
house mice Mus domesticus (Rusu and Krackow 2004) and meerkats Suricata suricatta (Clutton-
Brock et al. 2006), or access to a breeding position or high rank in a dominance hierarchy, for 
example in many primates (Cowlishaw and Dunbar 1991) and social wasps (Strassmann 1981; 
Premnath, Sinha, and Gadagkar 1996; Cant et al. 2006). There may also be conflict over how 
much effort non-breeders invest (Komdeur and Heg 2005) in helping or working (here, we use 
these terms, and “helper” and “worker”, interchangeably): this is the focus of the present 
experiment.  
 
Conflict over the extent to which workers work can arise for two non-mutually exclusive kin-
selected (Hamilton 1964) reasons. Firstly, the benefit of helping may vary, for example 
according to the helper’s relatedness to the breeder. There is some evidence that less related 
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helpers provide less help, e.g. in white-fronted bee-eaters Merops bullockoides (Emlen and 
Wrege 1988) and paper wasps Polistes dominulus (Queller et al. 2000; but see Leadbeater et al. 
2010). Secondly, the cost of helping may vary, for example according to the helper’s chances of 
obtaining direct fitness benefits in the future, as observed in subordinate foundresses in the social 
wasps P. dominulus (Cant and Field 2001) and Liostenogaster flavolineata (Field et al. 2006), 
and subordinate banded mongooses Mungos mungo (Cant 2003). In addition, helpers may 
withhold help if doing so yields a net fitness benefit, as in the cases of “false feeding” in white-
winged choughs Corcorax melanorhamphos (Boland et al. 1997), carrion crows Corvus corone 
corone (Canestrari et al. 2004), and meerkats (Clutton-Brock et al. 2005). In this way, helpers 
may gain indirect fitness benefits from helping but also have the potential to gain direct fitness 
benefits from not helping. There is thus a tradeoff between investing in direct and indirect fitness 
benefits, which sets up a volunteer’s dilemma (Archetti 2009): a helper does best if someone else 
helps, but everyone does worse if no-one helps. This in turn may provide selection pressure for 
others to pay attention to which individuals are helping (Doutrelant and Covas 2007), and 
subsequently ensure that there is compensation for reduced help, as in long-tailed tits Aegithalos 
caudatus (Hatchwell 1999), or that the “lazy” helper is forced to work harder, as in naked mole-
rats Heterocephalus glaber (Reeve 1992); however, there is relatively scarce evidence from non-
human animals that punishment is used to promote future cooperation (Raihani et al. 2012).  
 
In this study, we use the primitively eusocial paper wasp Polistes dominulus to investigate 
whether group members pay attention to workers’ investment in work; that is, the effort they put 
into foraging for food to feed the queen’s offspring. Polistes is a genus of primitively eusocial 
paper wasps, and is a model system for the study of cooperation and conflict (Reeve 1991; Reeve 
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2001; Field and Cant 2006). Nests are founded by one or many queens, and reproductive skew is 
high in multiple foundress associations. Subordinate foundresses and, later in the season, 
workers help rear the dominant’s offspring by provisioning larvae. Foraging is costly for Polistes 
workers (Strassmann 1985; Pratte 1989; Reeve 1991), as is the case for other social insects 
(Schmid-Hempel and Wolf 1988; O’Donnell and Jeanne 1992), and thus is a good measure of 
cooperation in this system. Although this cost may be counterbalanced by the indirect fitness 
benefits of helping relatives, some P. dominulus nests may include unrelated group members 
(Queller et al. 2000; Zanette and Field 2008). Additionally, both subordinate foundresses and 
workers may also have the opportunity to gain direct fitness benefits. Subordinate foundresses 
can do so by queuing to inherit the alpha position (Leadbeater et al. 2011), and forage less when 
they have a higher probability of inheritance (Cant and Field 2001); they may also adopt an 
alternative reproductive strategy of “sitting-and-waiting” to take over other nests (Starks 1998). 
Polistes workers can gain direct benefits not only by laying male eggs, as can other 
hymenopteran workers (Hammond and Keller 2004), but also by attempting to become 
foundresses the next year (Reeve et al. 1998); those who adopt this strategy spend more time 
inactive and less time foraging (Tibbetts 2007).  
 
Polistes is also a model genus for the study of kin, nestmate and individual recognition (Gamboa 
et al. 1986; Gamboa 2004; Tibbetts and Dale 2007). Polistes wasps use cuticular hydrocarbons 
and nest odors to distinguish between nestmates and non-nestmates (Pfennig et al. 1983; Starks 
et al. 1998); in addition, species with more complex social systems have individually distinctive 
facial markings (Tibbetts 2004), and some of these species are able to remember individual 
conspecifics’ faces (P. fuscatus: Sheehan and Tibbetts 2008). Our study species, P. dominulus, 
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has variable facial markings that are thought to indicate dominance in North American 
populations (Tibbetts and Dale 2004; Green and Field 2011); worker and gyne markings differ 
but overlap (Tibbetts 2006). P. dominulus is not thought to be capable of individual recognition 
in the context of aggression among foundresses (Sheehan and Tibbetts 2010), although there 
have been no explicit tests of individual recognition among foraging workers. The context-
dependent ability of P. dominulus workers to discriminate between conspecifics, such as 
nestmates versus non-nestmates (Starks et al. 1998), makes it reasonable to suggest that workers 
may be able to keep track of what nestmates are doing, which is a key assumption in this study. 
 
In our experimental manipulation, we removed P. dominulus workers for different amounts of 
time during busy foraging periods, and gave them either access to food or no food while they 
were kept in the laboratory. We observed each focal removed worker’s return to her nest in order 
to determine whether the time she was away from her nest or whether she had access to food 
resulted in changes in aggressive behavior after she came back to her nest. Firstly, we consider 
non-mutually exclusive alternative hypotheses for the potential effect of removing the focal 
worker for different amounts of time (summarized in Table 5.1a): 
Hypothesis 1: time not perceived. Nestmates do not or cannot tell how long a given worker has 
spent off the nest. Prediction: there will be no difference between the aggression received by 
focal removed worker and that received by any non-focal worker on the nest, regardless of the 
duration of the focal worker’s removal. 
Hypothesis 2: lab odor. Nestmates detect a different odor on focal workers who have spent time 
in lab containers. Prediction: the longer a focal spends in the lab, the stronger the odor, and the 
more aggression she receives relative to non-focal workers.  
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Hypothesis 3: selfish time away. Nestmates perceive a focal worker spending time off the nest as 
her selfishly investigating opportunities for abandoning her natal nest. Prediction: the longer a 
focal spends away, the more aggression she receives relative to non-focal workers. 
Hypothesis 4: cooperative time away. Nestmates perceive a focal worker spending time off the 
nest as her cooperatively foraging for food to bring back to the nest. Prediction: the longer a 
focal spends away, the less aggression she receives relative to non-focal workers. 
Hypothesis 5: slow foraging. Nestmates regulate foraging based on the rate of incoming wasps, 
and aggression may be used to activate foraging, as in other social wasps (O’Donnell 1998; 
O’Donnell 2006; Lamba et al. 2008). Prediction: the longer a focal spends away, the more 
aggression there will be on the nest, but there will be no difference in aggression towards the 
focal worker relative to non-focal workers. 
 
Secondly, we consider non-mutually exclusive alternative hypotheses for the potential effect of 
giving the focal worker access to food in the lab (summarized in Table 5.1b): 
Hypothesis 6: food not perceived. Nestmates do not or cannot perceive whether a focal worker 
has had access to food in the lab. Prediction: there will be no difference between the aggression 
received by focal removed worker and that received by any non-focal worker on the nest, 
regardless of the experimental food treatment. (Note that a wasp potentially paying attention to a 
worker bringing in food is qualitatively different to a wasp potentially paying attention to 
whether a particular individual has spent a certain amount of time off the nest, and thus we 
present hypotheses 1 and 6 separately.) 
Hypothesis 7: punishment for laziness. Aggression is used to punish wasps who return from 
foraging trips without food. Prediction: focal workers who have not had access to food in the lab 
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will receive more aggression relative to non-focal workers than will focal workers who have had 
access to food. 
Hypothesis 8: punishment for eating. Aggression is used to punish wasps who have eaten food 
before they have returned to the nest. Prediction: focal workers who have had access to food in 
the lab will receive more aggression relative to non-focal workers than will focal workers who 
have not had access to food. 
Hypothesis 9: obtaining food. Aggression is used to take food from wasps who are returning to 
the nest. Prediction: focal workers who have had access to food in the lab will receive more 
aggression relative to non-focal workers than will focal workers who have not had access to food 
Hypothesis 10: insufficient foraging. A focal worker returning having not had access to food 
from the lab is a cue that other nestmates should increase their foraging rate, and aggression may 
be used to activate foraging. Prediction: there will be more aggression on the nest when the focal 
returns without food, but there will be no difference in aggression towards the focal worker 
relative to non-focal workers.  
We conducted the experimental worker removals in order to attempt to falsify each hypothesis.
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Table 5.1. Summary of hypotheses and predictions relating to (a) the time the focal worker 
spends off the nest, and (b) whether she had access to food while she was in the lab. “Relative 
aggression to focal” is the difference between the rate of aggression directed to the focal worker 
and the mean rate of aggression directed towards any one of her worker-nestmates (this provides 
an internal control for the background level of aggression on each nest: see methods for more 
details). 
 
 
(a) 
Predicted change in aggression with increased 
focal worker time away 
Hypothesis 
Relative aggression to 
focal increases 
Relative aggression to 
focal decreases 
Relative aggression to 
focal does not change 
1. Time not perceived 
 
  √ 
2. Lab odor 
 
√   
3. Selfish time away 
 
√   
4. Cooperative time 
away 
 √  
5. Slow foraging 
 
  √ 
 
 
(b) 
Predicted change in aggression with focal worker having 
access to food (F) versus no food (N) 
Hypothesis 
Relative aggression to 
focal increases 
Relative aggression to 
focal decreases 
Relative aggression to 
focal does not change 
6. Food not perceived 
 
  √ 
7. Punishment for 
laziness 
 √  
8. Punishment for 
eating 
√   
9. Obtaining food 
 
√   
10. Insufficient 
foraging 
  √ 
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METHODS 
 
Experimental procedure 
 
We conducted a total of 71 removal experiments on 34 Polistes dominulus nests naturally 
occurring on the eaves of buildings at the Liddell Field Station near Ithaca, NY. All nests were in 
the worker phase (late June – July 2010), and foundresses had been marked earlier in the season 
before workers emerged. We carried out experiments between 10am and 4 pm on sunny days 
(temperature 17.3 – 28.1oC), when foraging rates were high. 
 
For each removal, the experimenter used an insect net to catch a worker as she was arriving at or 
leaving the nest, gave the focal worker a unique mark with dots of enamel paint on her thorax, 
and put her in a plastic container in the laboratory. Each experimental trial varied with respect to 
(1) the amount of time the focal worker was kept in the lab, ranging from 8 to 150 min; and (2) 
whether the focal worker had access to food (F treatment) or not (N treatment), with focal 
workers in the F treatment having access to a sugar cube and piece of caterpillar (Manduca sexta 
larva) in their containers. We assigned nests to the different food and time treatments randomly 
with respect to size and location. When we carried out more than one removal on the same nest, 
we used a different focal worker each time, carried out one F and one N food treatment 
(counterbalanced for order among nests), and attempted to match the two removals for the time 
the focal worker was held in the lab. We verified with a χ2 test that the proportion of wasps 
caught when arriving, leaving or unknown did not differ between F and N treatments (p>0.2). 
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After the assigned period in the lab, the experimenter released the focal worker underneath her 
nest, and immediately began a video recording of the nest. We measured the time the focal 
worker took to return to her nest after she was released, as she frequently did not fly back to her 
nest immediately, and captured her return on video. We excluded any experiments that failed (for 
example, when wasps did not come back, or returned to a different nest), and were thus left with 
a total of 50 removals from 31 nests; 18 of these nests had focal workers in both an F and an N 
treatment. 
 
Observations and analyses 
 
We used the video recordings to observe behavior on each nest for the minute immediately after 
the focal returned. (Pilot observations suggested that there were no changes in behavior 
associated with the focal’s arrival after one minute.) The observer scored the number of 
aggressive acts (darts and lunges; no other aggressive behaviors were observed, as expected in 
the worker phase: Reeve 1991) directed towards the focal worker and towards each other worker 
by both workers and foundresses; all instances of trophallaxis, noting whether the focal or other 
workers were involved; and the number of other workers (excluding the focal) and foundresses 
on the nest at the start and end of the observation minute. The observer did not score behaviors 
when the focal worker was not visible, for example if she went behind the nest during the 
observation minute, or left the nest before the minute had ended. We controlled for the length of 
the observation period by calculating rates of aggression and trophallaxis (i.e. instances of 
aggression or trophallaxis per minute). 
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We calculated the mean rate of aggression directed towards non-focal workers (i.e. aggression 
rate divided by the mean number of non-focal workers), and the rate of aggression towards the 
focal worker. We then subtracted the former from the latter to give the difference between the 
rate of aggression to the focal and the mean rate of aggression to any other worker on the nest 
(hereafter, “relative aggression to focal”). We calculated an equivalent measure for the difference 
between the rate of trophallaxis involving the focal worker and the rate of trophallaxis involving 
any non-focal worker (hereafter, “relative focal trophallaxis”). Using these measurements 
provides an internal control for each nest: although external factors such as temperature may 
affect the rate of P. dominulus behaviors (Tibbetts and Reeve 2000), the difference between the 
rate of the focal’s and the mean rate of other wasps’ behaviors should not be affected. We 
verified this in our bootstrap analysis (see below), and subsequently excluded temperature from 
all analyses. We also checked that relative aggression to the focal worker did not differ among 
those that were caught when they were arriving, leaving, or unknown (Kruskal-Wallis test: 
p>0.4).  
 
Statistics 
 
The data were not normally distributed, and therefore we used tests that required no assumptions 
of normality. Firstly, we carried out bootstrap analyses (Mooney and Duval 1993) in 
Mathematica 8.0 (Wolfram Research), sampling the data 20,000 times. In each bootstrap 
iteration, the program only took one data set from each nest: that is, it randomly chose data from 
only one experiment for any nest used for two experiments. This gave 31 data sets for each 
iteration, and allowed us to exclude nest identity from the analysis. The algorithm generated a 
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mean value and 95% confidence intervals for the coefficient of each predictor; if the confidence 
intervals excluded zero, then we consider that predictor term to significantly affect the response 
term in the model. 
 
Secondly, for the 18 nests used in both F and N treatments, we carried out paired Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests in R 2.15 (R Development Core Team). This allowed us a more sensitive test of 
the effect of food treatment. 
 
 
RESULTS  
 
Effects of time away from nest and food treatment on aggression 
 
In a bootstrap analysis (20,000 iterations, sampling from 31 nests and taking one data set per 
nest), neither the total time a focal worker spent away from the nest during the experiment, the 
lab food treatment (food, F; or no food, N), nor the interaction between time and food 
significantly predicted the relative aggression rate towards the focal worker upon her return 
(Figure 5.1a). However, in a paired comparison of the 18 nests used in both F and N treatments, 
relative aggression to the focal was significantly higher in F than in N treatments (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test: V = 132, p = 0.0092); that is, the focal worker received more aggression relative 
to others when she returned with food. Furthermore, relative aggression towards the focal was 
significantly different from zero in F treatments (one-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test: V = 178, p 
= 0.0068), but not in N treatments (V = 56, p = 0.3437). Thus, when the focal worker had access 
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to food in the lab, she received more aggression than when she did not have access to food, and 
also received more aggression on average than did other workers on her nest (Figure 5.1b). Note 
that our video observations did not confirm whether wasps had fed, as only one focal worker was 
identified as bringing back food, and we could not determine whether focal workers had food in 
their crops; however, we did observe workers in the F treatment eating while they were in the lab 
(J.L. Barker, personal observation). 
 
Effects of lab manipulations on time taken to return to nest 
 
In the bootstrap analysis above, we used the total time a focal worker was away from the nest 
(i.e. time held in lab plus time taken to return after release), because this is what other wasps 
would perceive if they are paying attention to her absence. However, released focal workers took 
variable amounts of time to return to their nests. Using the same bootstrap algorithm as above 
(20,000 iterations, sampling from 31 nests, and randomly taking only one data set per nest for 
nests used for two experiments) we found that the time the focal took to return to her nest was 
not significantly predicted by the time she was held in the lab, the food treatment, or the 
interaction between lab time and food. 
 
Links between trophallaxis and aggression 
 
It is possible that the effect of the experimental food treatment on the relative rate of aggression 
received by the focal worker is mediated by trophallaxis. Firstly, we included trophallaxis as a 
predictor in the bootstrap model of aggression, and found that the focal’s relative trophallaxis 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
Figure 5.1 (a) The difference between the rate of aggression to the focal worker and the mean 
rate to other workers was not significantly affected by the time the focal spent away from the 
nest, whether she was fed, or the interaction between food and time (bootstrap analysis with 
20,000 runs, sampling 50 experiments on 31 nests). (b) On the 18 nests on which we carried out 
both a food (F) and no food (N) experiment, the difference between the rate of aggression to the 
focal worker and the mean rate to other workers was significantly greater than zero when the 
focal worker had access to food in the lab, but not significant when she did not (means ±s.e.). 
This difference in aggression was significantly higher when the focal worker had access to food 
compared to when she had no food.
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rate did not significantly affect the relative aggression she received. Secondly, we carried out an 
analogous bootstrap analysis of trophallaxis, including time and food as predictor variables in the 
model, as above, but substituting relative trophallaxis rate for relative aggression rate. In this 
analysis, neither the time the focal spent away from the nest, the food treatment, nor the 
interaction between time and food significantly predicted her relative trophallaxis rate (Figure 
5.2a). Thirdly, in a paired comparison of nests used in both F and N experiments, food treatment 
did not significantly affect the focal’s relative trophallaxis rate (Wilcoxon signed rank test: V = 
36.5, p = 0.5523); additionally, there was no significant difference between the number of F 
versus N experiments in which the focal worker engaged in trophallaxis (χ2 = 0.0611, p = 
0.8048). However, the focal’s relative trophallaxis rate was significantly different from zero in 
both F treatments (one-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test: V = 104, p = 0.0013) and N treatments 
(V = 135, p = 0.0005). That is, the focal worker engaged in trophallaxis more frequently on 
average than did other workers on her nest, regardless of whether she had had access to food 
(Figure 5.2b). 
 
A potential explanation for the increased aggression received by focal workers in the F treatment 
is that they had consumed food while off the nest but were withholding it from other workers by 
not engaging in trophallaxis. If this were the case, one might expect relative aggression to the 
focal to be different between F and N treatments when the focal engaged in trophallaxis, but not 
in cases when the focal did not engage in trophallaxis, because the workers would not be able to 
tell whether she had eaten. In fact, in experiments in which the focal was involved in 
trophallaxis, the relative aggression rate towards her was higher in F treatments than N 
treatments (insufficient sample size for paired comparison; Wilcoxon rank sum test on 13 F 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
Figure 5.2. (a) The difference between the focal worker’s trophallaxis rate and the mean rate of 
other workers was not significantly affected by the time the focal spent off the nest, whether she 
was fed, or the interaction between food and time (bootstrap analysis with 20,000 runs, sampling 
50 experiments on 31 nests). (b) On the 18 nests on which we carried out both a food (F) and no 
food (N) experiment, the difference between the focal worker’s trophallaxis rate and the mean 
rate of other workers on the same nest was significantly greater than zero, but was not 
significantly different between the F and N treatments (means ±s.e.). 
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experiments and 15 N experiments: W = 148.5, p = 0.0179; Figure 5.3). In experiments in which 
the focal was not involved with trophallaxis, this difference was no longer significant 
(insufficient sample size for paired comparison; Wilcoxon rank sum test on 11 F experiments 
and 11 N experiments: W = 87.5, p = 0.0805). Thus, when the focal worker engaged in 
trophallaxis, she still received more aggression in the F than the N treatment, but this was not the 
case when she did not engage in trophallaxis. 
 
Effect of aggression on latency to next departure 
 
If a possible function of aggression is to punish focal workers who returned without food, then 
one might predict that focal workers who received more aggression relative to their nestmates 
would depart sooner for another foraging trip. In order to test this prediction, we calculated the 
amount of time the focal wasp spent on her nest after the minute of observation as a percentage 
of the total amount of time remaining on the video tape after the observation minute. Using the 
bootstrap algorithm described above, we found that the percentage of time a focal wasp spent on 
the nest was not significantly predicted by the amount of aggression she received, or by whether 
she had had access to food in the lab. 
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Figure 5.3. In experiments where the focal worker was involved in trophallaxis upon her return 
to the nest, the difference between the rate of aggression towards her and the mean rate towards 
other wasps was significantly higher when she had access to food in the lab (n=13) than when 
she did not (n=15). When the focal worker was not involved in trophallaxis, the aggression rate 
was not significantly different in food (n=11) versus no food (n=11) treatments. Figure shows 
means ±s.e. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Aggression towards returning foragers 
 
For the 18 pairs of nests with one food and one non-food treatment each, focal workers who 
returned to the nest having had access to food received more aggression relative to other workers 
than when they returned without having had access to food. This suggests that nestmates are able 
to perceive some difference in the focal worker, and thus does not support hypothesis 6 
(hypotheses and predictions summarized in Table 5.1). This result is also inconsistent with 
hypothesis 7, which predicts that focal workers receive more aggression when they have not had 
access to food, as punishment for not bringing food back. 
 
Both hypotheses 8 and 9 predict that focal workers who return to the nest having had access to 
food would receive more aggression than those who have not, and this prediction is supported by 
our experimental manipulation of food. The difference between these two hypotheses is in the 
function of aggression: under hypothesis 8, aggression is a mechanism to obtain food from a 
focal worker who may be attempting to withhold it, while under hypothesis 9, aggression is a 
means to punish a focal worker who has eaten food (e.g. it is present in her crop) before she has 
returned to the nest. If the latter were true, one might expect wasps who received more 
aggression to depart for another foraging trip more quickly; however, in the bootstrap analysis of 
the percentage of time spent on the nest after arrival, the relative aggression rate towards the 
focal worker did not predict how soon she would depart. An additional possibility is that a wasp 
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who has fed off the nest and received aggression is less likely to do so the next time she forages, 
regardless of how quickly she leaves. 
 
Although workers in the food treatment did eat while they were in the lab (J.L. Barker, personal 
observation), we were unable to identify on the video recordings whether focal workers returned 
with food. Instead, we statistically investigated whether relative aggression to the focal worker in 
the food versus no food treatment was different when the focal had engaged in trophallaxis upon 
her return to the nest: if aggression is used to obtain food forcibly, then a worker who engages in 
trophallaxis may be subject to less aggression. However, the trophallaxis results did not allow us 
to distinguish between these hypotheses, as the increased aggression towards focal workers who 
had had access to food in the lab did not differ between instances when the focal worker was 
involved in trophallaxis and those where she was not. Thus, although aggression may be a means 
to obtain food forcibly from an arriving forager (hypothesis 8), it is unlikely that wasps are using 
trophallaxis to mediate aggressive interactions relating to food.  
 
Aggression and regulation of work in wasps and other animals 
 
The results from the paired comparison of aggression in the food treatment are also inconsistent 
with hypothesis 10, which predicts no difference in relative aggression towards the focal wasp, 
regardless of food treatment, but rather a decrease in the aggression rate overall when a focal 
wasp has had access to food. We cannot determine whether the latter was the case using the data 
presented here, as this study did not include baseline measurements of aggression on 
unmanipulated nests.  
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The bootstrap analysis showed that the difference in aggression received by focal workers 
relative to other workers on the nest was not affected by the total length of time a focal worker 
spent off the nest. This falsifies hypotheses 2 and 3, which predict that a focal worker will 
receive more aggression relative to her nestmates when she is away for longer, as well as 
hypothesis 4, which predicts the opposite effect. This result therefore cannot falsify hypothesis 1: 
that is, workers do not keep track of foraging effort by different individuals. However, it also 
does not falsify hypothesis 5: a focal worker spending a longer period of time off the nest may 
contribute to a slower foraging rate overall, and thus the aggression rate towards both the focal 
and non-focal workers may increase, in order to stimulate more foraging. This is the case in 
several other social wasp species, such as Ropalidia marginata (Bruyndonckx et al. 2006), 
Polistes instabilis (O’Donnell 1998; Molina and O’Donnell 2009)and Polybia occidentalis 
(O’Donnell 2006). An alternative explanation is that aggression is used to stimulate nest activity, 
as it is in Polistes fuscatus (Sumana and Starks 2004), and as may be necessary when food is 
brought in after an absence and must be distributed among larvae. However, we cannot address 
this possibility fully in this study without measurements of aggression on unmanipulated nests. 
 
In sum, combining the analyses of relative aggression towards the focal worker and aggression 
towards non-focal workers, the results are consistent with more than one of the non-mutually 
exclusive hypotheses (Table 5.1). Aggression may have a dual function: alerting wasps already 
on the nest to changes in food flow into the colony, while also being directed towards the 
incoming forager, dependent on the time she has been away and possible food she has consumed 
or brought back. Thus, P. dominulus workers may keep track of work effort both at the colony 
level (regulating foraging rate) and individual level (targeting particular incoming foragers based 
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on their behavior); note that the latter does not require individual recognition, but rather that 
workers are able to assess cues of nestmates’ foraging efforts. 
 
In cases where the colony-level explanation applies, keeping track of work effort may be an 
important component of the self-organization of many social groups (Gordon 1996; Bonabeau et 
al. 1997; Fewell 2003). In cases where individual-level behavior is important, the stage is set for 
potential conflict over different parties’ work investments to be translated into actual conflict 
(Ratnieks and Reeve 1992). Evidence from cooperatively breeding taxa suggests that this may 
occur in different ways: for example, inactive naked mole-rats receive more shoves from the 
queen (Reeve 1992) and respond by increasing their work rate; removed helpers in the 
cooperatively breeding cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher were not punished, but increased 
helping and appeasement behaviors when they returned, perhaps pre-empting punishment 
(Bergmüller and Taborsky 2005). In contrast, carrion crows appear to tolerate “lazy” helpers, 
which may provide a buffer for unpredictable scenarios when extra help is needed (Baglione et 
al. 2010). Thus, two general predictions arise concerning the function of aggression as 
punishment: firstly, if aggression does act as punishment, then it should be costly to the punished 
worker; and secondly, “lazy” workers are more likely to be punished when the cost of laziness to 
any other worker is higher, analogous to hymenopteran worker policing of male production 
(Wenseleers et al. 2004). Future studies could use a game theoretic approach, e.g. “tug-of-war” 
models (Reeve et al. 1998), to predict evolutionarily stable investments both in conflict over 
work and in work itself, and to guide future experimental tests. One might predict conflicts of 
interest over work effort to arise more frequently in societies where non-breeders have the 
potential to gain direct fitness benefits (Cant and Field 2001; Field and Cant 2009), although 
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these conflicts may be suppressed, given the accompanying selection for conflict reduction 
mechanisms (Ratnieks and Reeve 1992; Frank 2003; Ratnieks et al. 2006). These predictions 
apply not only to social wasps, but may help shed light on general principles of conflict 
reduction across social taxa (Reeve 2001). 
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